Equilibrium policy portfolios when some investors are restricted from holding certain assets

Abstract

PurposeThe authors analyze the equilibrium effects of non-tradable assets on optimal policy portfolios. They study how the existence of non-tradable assets impacts optimal asset allocation decisions of investors who own such assets and of investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets.Design/methodology/approachIn this theoretical analysis, the authors analyze a model with tradable and non-tradable asset classes whose cash flows are jointly normally distributed. There are two types of investors, with and without access to non-tradable assets. All investors have constant absolute risk aversion preferences. The authors derive closed form solutions for optimal investor demand and equilibrium asset prices. They calibrated the model using US data for listed equity, bonds and private equity. Further, the authors illustrate the sensitivities of quantities and prices with respect to the main parameters.FindingsThe study finds that the existence of non-tradable assets has a large impact on optimal asset allocation. Investors with (without) access to non-tradable assets tilt their portfolios of tradable assets away from (toward) assets to which non-tradable assets exhibit positive betas.Practical implicationsThe model provides important insights not only for investors holding non-tradable assets such as private equity but also for investors who do not have access to non-tradable assets. Investors who ignore the effect of non-tradable assets when reverse-engineering risk premia from asset covariances and market capitalizations might severely underestimate the equity risk premium.Originality/valueThe authors provide the first comprehensive analysis of the equilibrium effects of non-tradability of some assets on optimal policy portfolios. Thus, this paper goes beyond analyzing the effects of market imperfections on individual portfolio choices.

The impact of a systemic tax on bank capital holdings, optimal capital requirements and social welfare

“…As the income is strictly increasing with 𝑟 𝑚 * and the income is negative for low 𝑟 𝑚 , there should exist a unique 𝑟 𝑚 * that satisfies the above equations, and the large bank will thus charge this loan rate as the equilibrium rate (Randl et al, 2023;Repullo and Suarez, 2013). Regarding the equilibrium choice for the capital of the large bank, we have Proposition 1:…”