Equilibrium with Transaction Costs

Abstract

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Monetary equilibrium with buying and selling price spread without transactions costs

“…We would like to note that writers such as Lerner (1947), Hahn (1971), Starr (1974), Heller (1974), and others have either simply forced agents to demand fiat money at the terminal period or motivated such holdings requiring the payment of exogenously given lump sum taxes. In this context we could regard bid-ask spreads of prices in the present model as endogenous indirect taxes by the authority.…”

“…This equilibrium concept was introduced by Foley (1970) and Hahn (1971), and others such as Kurz (1974aKurz ( , 1974b, Starrett (1973), Hayashi (1974), Okuno (1974), Duffie (1990), etc. worked with this definition.…”

Commodity money equilibrium in a convex trading post economy with transaction costs

“…The issues of general equilibrium with transaction cost, efficiency of allocation and the implications for the role of money appear in Foley (1970), Hahn (1971Hahn ( , 1973, and Starrett (1973). Foley (1970) considers a static equilibrium with (consistent with the Arrow-Debreu treatment) a single market meeting.…”

“…Media of exchange are characterized as the carrier of value between transactions (not fulfilling final demands or input requirements themselves), the difference between gross and net trades 1 . Related general equilibrium models with transaction cost include Foley (1970), Hahn (1971Hahn ( , 1973, Kurz(1974), Starrett (1973), Starr (2003C).…”

Relational Goods at Work! Crime and Sport Participation in Italy: Evidence from Panel Data Regional Analysis Over the Period 1997-2003

“…Needless to say, a match played by Ivan and Jacob will be different from a match played between John and Jimmy. In brief, a relational good must be necessarily a named good in the spirit of Hahn (1971).…”