Equitable rent division on a soft budget

Velez, Rodrigo A.

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008

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2023

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Cited by 2 publications

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“…The solution proposed is to lift the assumption of quasi-linearity of preferences and ask agents to report their marginal disutility for exceeding their budget. Velez [22] investigates the incentive-compatibility of such mechanisms. Our notion of budget-friendly envy-freeness draws inspiration from work on envyfreeness in fair division with budgeted bidders [3,4,13,14], and is related (in spirit) to justified envy-freeness in two-sided matching [1].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Rent Division on a Budget Revisited

Airiau,

Gilbert,

Grandi

et al. 2023

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

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Rent division consists in simultaneously computing an allocation of rooms to agents and a payment, starting from an individual valuation of each room by each agent. When agents have budget limits, it is known that envy-free solutions do not necessarily exist. We propose two solutions to overcome this problem. In the first one, we relax envy-freeness to account for budget disparities. In the second one, we allow fractional allocations, in which agents may change rooms during the duration of the lease.

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