Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits

Shiell, Leslie

doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00028-1

Cited by 18 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In order to compare our results with those obtained by Chichilnisky and Heal (1994), Shiell (2003), and Sandmo (2005), let us consider again our model in the absence of local externalities and public goods. We have G i = 0, and constraint (29) becomes C i + X i = Y i .…”

Section: A Third Bestmentioning

confidence: 94%

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Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

d’Autume

Schubert

Withagen

2016

J Public Economic Theory

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International audienceInternational di¤erences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justi…ed by different local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by di¤erent preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have to be …nanced through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump-sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country-speci…c, dealing with the local negative externality, a second one, country-speci…c, dealing with the cost of levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump-sum transfers between governments are impossible to implement, international di¤erentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity concerns. keywords: carbon price, second best, Pigovian taxatio

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Section: A Third Bestmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Both hypersurfaces in the space of utility levels will be tangent. This property has been stressed by Shiell (2003). Other third best optimum allocations are not second best optimum allocations.…”

Section: A Third Bestmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

d’Autume

Schubert

Withagen

2016

J Public Economic Theory

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“…First, Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) showed that, in the case of a public good produced in a decentralised way, equity and efficiency are no longer separable when no transfer is allowed between countries. Even when transfers are allowed, not all distributions of quotas are efficient, since redistributing wealth changes the optimum mitigation target (Chichilnisky and Heal, 2000;Shiell, 2003). Second, equity considerations also pervade the pure cost-efficiency analysis in a more technical way.…”

Section: Intragenerational Equitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Global Climate Justice: From Negotiation Stances to Moral Stakes and Back

Pottier

Méjean

Godard

2017

IRERE

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International audienceClimate change poses immense problems of intergenerational, intragenerational and international justice. This critical survey describes the intellectual landscape of global climate justice, and clarifies the challenges, positions, arguments and theoretical background of this concept. To do so, we review how equity is mobilised in the climate change economics literature and confront arguments about justice used within or at the periphery of climate negotiations with those of moral and political philosophers. We present the stances of States, NGOs and experts. We discuss the principles of justice underpinning the fair sharing of a carbon budget and their moral justifications. We examine the concepts of climate damage and of responsibility and highlight the hurdles to make way for historical emissions in climate * This survey owes a lot to the research of Olivier Godard on the topic of climate Pottier et al. justice. We conclude on some implications of the Paris Agreement for climate justice and the way forward

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“… 9 On the same footing, Shiell ( 2003 , p. 44) notes that “If negative allocations were permitted for some countries, then the system would be equivalent to unrestricted lump sum transfers.” …”

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confidence: 99%

Climate change control: the Lindahl solution

Groot

Swart

2017

Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change

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The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate different burden sharing rules with respect to abatement of carbon emissions. We evaluate seven different rules both in terms of their redistributive impact and by the extent to which they realize the aim of optimal abatement. We show that the Lindahl solution, where the burden sharing rule of carbon abatement is determined by each region’s willingness to pay, is to be preferred above the non-cooperative Nash outcome. Poor regions however would prefer the social planner outcome with a global permit market, because then the burden sharing rule has a secondary role of income redistribution by means of transfers from rich to poor, on top of its primary role of assigning abatement burdens. Based on these findings, we argue that in order to control global greenhouse gas emissions, the level of individual country emission abatement effort should be a function of their willingness to pay to curb climate change, rather than their historical emissions or ability to abate.

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Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits

Cited by 18 publications

References 8 publications

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

A Survey of Global Climate Justice: From Negotiation Stances to Moral Stakes and Back

Climate change control: the Lindahl solution

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