Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control

Bosello, Francesco; Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo

doi:10.1162/154247603322391233

Cited by 62 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…These results depend only on very general properties of the underlying valuation functions, in particular superadditivity and positive externalities. Therefore, we could claim that our theoretical results are likely to hold for most models of transboundary pollution control (indeed, this is the case for the model used in Bosello et al 2003) or even for other types of international public good provision problems (like for instance disease control or fighting international terrorism). Of course, the particular coalition structures that can be made self enforcing will always depend on the parameterization of the simulation models.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…For the 7 This simplification would not be possible if we were to allow for multiple non-trivial coalitions as for instance considered in Bosello et al (2003Bosello et al ( , 2004, Carraro (2000), Eyckmans and Finus (2003) and Finus (2003b). 8 This simple theoretical framework has often been adopted in the literature on international environmental agreements where the assumption of a coalition structure with a single coalition is the most obvious and realistic and where the game is characterized by positive externalities.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Later papers have looked at the effect of various ex-ante and ex-post transfers rules on the success of coalition formation and on the possibility of expanding stable coalitions (see Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2004;Bosello et al, 2003Bosello et al, , 2004Carraro and Siniscalco, 2001;Finus, 2003, 2004a;Finus et al, 2004;Weikart et al, 2004). Most of these papers used a more elaborate empirical model, looked not only at stylized transfer schemes derived from cooperative game theory, but also considered schemes that are based on various moral motives for "fair sharing", that considered transfers via permit trading and allowed for the possibility of multiple coalitions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Barrett (2001) draws a rather pessimistic picture of the Chander-Tulkens´ transfer rule in the context of a non-cooperative coalition model, whereas Eyckmans and Finus (2003) come to a more optimistic conclusion. Moreover, Bosello et al (2003) find some evidence that equitable sharing rules can enhance efficiency by increasing the number of signatories of an environmental treaty, whereas Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2004) derive the exact opposite conclusion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

2005

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“…A number of studies apply static or repeated games to consider countries' strategic choice of GHG emissions , Finus 2001). Bosello et al (2003) and Eyckmans and Tulkens (2002) incorporate the dynamics of GHG stock to analyze an international agreement on climate change. These game theoretic studies focus on the stability of an environmental treaty by a subset of countries where the treaty members are assumed to cooperate even when cheating may improve a treaty member's welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation on climate-change mitigation

Mason

Polasky

Tarui

2017

European Economic Review

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We model greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by countries as a dynamic game in which the emissions increase atmospheric concentrations of GHG that negatively affect all countries' welfare. Each country in each time period chooses a level of emissions, understanding that the combination of all countries' emissions influences the evolution of the GHG stock. We allow for heterogeneities in countries' payoffs. Within this setting, we analyze self-enforcing climatechange treaties which are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game. We provide a simulation model to illustrate the conditions when it is possible to support a first best outcome. We also parameterize the simulation model to mimic current conditions to show whether a self-enforcing agreement that achieves optimal climate change policy is possible, the structure of what such a solution might look like, and which countries have the most to gain from such a agreement.

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Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation

Buchner¹,

Carraro²,

Cersosimo³

et al. 2005

Advances in Global Change Research

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation SummaryThe US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties drastically reduce the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. The reason is not only the reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries' relative bargaining power induced by the US decision. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse whether an incentive strategy exists that could induce the US to revise their decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments. One solution, occasionally proposed in the literature and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R&D cooperation. This paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on climate change control and on technological innovation. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (GHG emissions and R&D) will be examined from the view point of countries' profitability and freeriding incentives. Finally, after having assessed the effectiveness and credibility of the issue linkage strategy, we explore the economic and environmental benefits of a new, recently proposed regime, which aims at achieving GHG emission control by enhancing cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion (without targets on emissions).

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Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control

Cited by 62 publications

References 21 publications

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Cooperation on climate-change mitigation

Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation

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