Ernesto Calvo (2014). Legislator Success in Fragmented Congresses in Argentina. Plurality Cartels, Minority Presidents, and Lawmaking

Experts, aliens, and everyone in between: Agriculture committee assignments and sector embeddedness in the Argentine Congress

“…Canonical literature on the Argentine Congress highlights that these rules produce a parliament with very limited initiative (Bonvecchi & Mustapic, 2011; Calvo, 2014), focused mainly on local issues; induce a high degree of party discipline (Jones, 2002); and do not offer legislators enough incentives to develop legislative careers (Jones, Saiegh, et al, 2002). Since party leaderships choose the nominees and setup ballot lists, candidates have little influence over their own future.…”

“…First, it focuses on one committee that has received little attention, despite the weight of the agricultural sector in the national economy. Studies on Argentina compare different standing committees at the national (Danesi & Rheault, 2011; Jones, Saiegh, et al, 2002) and the subnational levels (Malamud, 1999; Rodríguez, 2012) or tackle committees' work rather than their composition (Calvo & Sagarzazu, 2011; Calvo, 2014; Goretti & Panosyan, 1986; Kikuchi, 2018; Micozzi, 2014; 2018). Second, it tests two perspectives usually relegated in the study of the Argentine Congress.…”

The Politics of Experimentation: Political Competition and Randomized Controlled Trials

“…A systematic study of CCT program design and implementation across Latin America found that the most important explanatory variable for the stringency of CCT design (including the legal requirement of proper evaluation) that curbed discretionary clientelistic targeting was the existence of opposition checks on the president. A significant presence of the opposition in parliament and divided governments where the executive and legislature are dominated by different parties allow even minority legislators to constrain the executive (Calvo, 2014). Since the guidelines for CCT programs are subject to legislative approval every year, monitoring and evaluation criteria received significant attention from opposition legislators who refused to vote for the program in the absence of solid guarantees from the executive.…”