Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

Domestic Military Deployments in Response to COVID-19

“…This increased popularity, as well as the institutional and personal contacts with local leaders and interest groups enabled by domestic deployment in disaster relief ( Kalkman & Groenewegen, 2019 ), can also translate both into more expansive demands for budgets and prerogatives by the military and into a reduced willingness or ability of civilian leaders to reject those demands ( Beliakova, 2021 ; Brooks, 2019 ; Feaver, 2003 ; Golby et al, 2017 ; Ratchev & Tagarev, 2018 ). Indeed, this dynamic was already evident in recent debates over military spending in the European Union ( Lazaro, 2020 ).…”

“…Even if it does not lead to coups, human rights abuses, and other instances of overt harm, we can nonetheless expect the expansion of what militaries see as their appropriate realm of action to increase contestation of the kind observed in Israel over whether militaries or civilian authorities are best positioned to act in response to disasters. Importantly, the existence of this contestation itself and its expansion into a new policy arena marks a shift in the balance between civil and military authorities ( Beliakova, 2021 ; Brooks, 2016 ; Cottey et al, 2002 ; Croissant et al, 2010 , pp. 957–958; Stepan, 1988 ).…”

Parliaments and Security Sector Governance—Contributing to Just and Peaceful Societies

“…More recent theories highlight that security sector accountability should not only be seen in terms of the sector's potential involvement in the management of the state, but as a constantly evolving process subject to evolving challenges. Beliakova (2021), for example, argues that civilian control of the military in democracies can erode over time through actions such as insubordination, deference of security-related policy-making to the security sector and competition between security sector and government. Of specific value is Beliakova's focus on the potential damage to civil-military relations when civilian policy-making decreases and the military's power in politics increase.…”

Introduction

“…Transparency International defines security sector policy as 'the laws, strategies, and approaches used by governments to decide on the scope and activities of the military and national security agencies' (Cover & Meran 2013: 40). Parliaments are responsible for ensuring that policy aligns with the needs of the people and is implemented accordingly, and in so doing it prevents the security sector from becoming the dominant role-player in security sector policymaking (Beliakova, 2021;Yamamoto 2007: 9). Oversight of policy therefore allows for opportunities to ensure alignment with human security needs and the SDGs.…”