Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations

Zhang, Huanren

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023

Cited by 13 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…For discussions on other factors that influence contributions to public goods, seeLedyard (1995) andChaudhuri (2011). There are also studies showing that risk can influence strategic behaviors in two-player prisoner's dilemma(Fudenberg et al, 2012;Zhang, 2018).3 Consider the case of a war: fighting for one's own group increases the chance for the group to survive, but the fighter bears the cost of fighting while the benefit is shared by all the other group members.…”

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confidence: 99%

Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods

Zhang

2019

Journal of Economic Psychology

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In order to study whether common fate induced by shared risk can promote cooperation, I introduce two types of risks into a public goods game: risk that is common among all group members (the COM treatment), and risk that is independent across individuals (the IND treatment). In both treatments, zero contributions is the only equilibrium. In contrast to the equilibrium analysis, contributions to the public goods in the experiment approach zero under the independent risk but remain at high levels when the common risk is present. Analysis of the data reveals that different reactions to beliefs are fundamental to this treatment effect. While beliefs and contributions in the first periods, as well as the belief formation processes, are similar across treatments, subjects in the IND treatment are significantly less cooperative than those in the COM treatment with the same beliefs. A large variation in group contributions is observed in the COM treatment. Further analysis shows that initial beliefs can explain most of the variation in the long-run contribution level, implying the importance of beliefs in shaping the players' experience and establishing group norms.

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confidence: 99%

Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods

Zhang

2019

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Bounded rationality is regarded as the boundedness of human rationality, which is a basic fact about the complexities of the world. That hypothesis means that there is no chance or ability to independently evaluate a large number of facts and propositions in such an environment [16][17][18][19][20]. Limited rationality means that humans usually achieve game equilibrium through trial and error [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Improved Lotka–Volterra Model Using Quantum Game Theory

Huang

Delang

et al. 2021

Mathematics

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Human decision-making does not conform to the independent decision-making hypothesis from classical decision-making theory. Thus, we introduce quantum decision-making theory into the Lotka–Volterra model (L–V model), to investigate player population dynamics while incorporating the initial strategy, game payoffs and interactive strategies in an open social system. Simulation results show that: (1) initial strategy, entanglement intensity of strategy interaction, and payoffs impact population dynamics; (2) In cooperative coexistence, game players mutually exceed the initial environmental capacity in an open system, but not in competitive coexistence; (3) In competitive coexistence, an initial strategy containing an entanglement intensity of strategies plays a vital role in game outcomes. Furthermore, our proposed model more realistically delineates the characteristics of population dynamics in competitive or cooperative coexistence scenarios.

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“…4). In some instances, errors can even enhance cooperation 54 . This body of work is based on the insight that evolutionarily stable cooperation is impossible in simultaneous games without errors [55][56][57][58][59] .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints

2022

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In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematically characterize all Nash equilibria among memory-one strategies. Moreover, we use evolutionary simulations to explore various model extensions, exploring the effect of discounted games, irregular alternation patterns, and higher memory. In all cases, we observe that mutual cooperation still evolves for a wide range of parameter values. However, compared to simultaneous games, alternating games require different strategies to maintain cooperation in noisy environments. Moreover, none of the respective strategies are evolutionarily stable.

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Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations

Cited by 13 publications

References 51 publications

Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods

Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods

An Improved Lotka–Volterra Model Using Quantum Game Theory

Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints

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