2016
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0006-6
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Escape from Third-Best: Rating Emissions for Intensity Standards

Abstract: An increasingly common type of environmental policy instrument limits the carbon intensity of transportation and electricity markets. In order to extend the policy's scope beyond point-of-use emissions, regulators assign each competing fuel an emission intensity rating for use in calculating compliance. I show that welfare-maximizing ratings do not generally coincide with the best estimates of actual emissions. In fact, the regulator can achieve a higher level of welfare by manipulating the emission ratings th… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Giving a larger credit to gas than its emissions would suggest boosts efficiency because it offsets that preexisting distortion. This result is broadly similar to Lemoine's (2013) result that welfare-maximizing intensity ratings do not always reflect actual emissions intensities due to market interactions, though that paper does not consider interactions with tax distortions. higher distortionary costs per dollar raised than do taxes on labor income.…”
Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting
confidence: 78%
“…Giving a larger credit to gas than its emissions would suggest boosts efficiency because it offsets that preexisting distortion. This result is broadly similar to Lemoine's (2013) result that welfare-maximizing intensity ratings do not always reflect actual emissions intensities due to market interactions, though that paper does not consider interactions with tax distortions. higher distortionary costs per dollar raised than do taxes on labor income.…”
Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting
confidence: 78%
“…The remaining states 7 Theoretically, an RPS is a second-best instrument for attaining both the emission reduction and increased renewable generation goals. As an intensity standard, an RPS simultaneously subsidizes renewables and taxes nonrenewables (Helfand, 1991;Holland et al, 2009;Lemoine, 2016). But, the renewable subsidy and non-renewable tax are decided by only one instrument: the minimum percentage of renewables.…”
Section: Rps Policies and Rec Tradingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lemoine (2013) shows that the efficiency of an LCFS may increase if a regulator optimally sets both the fuel standard and fuels' CI factors. He extends the model in Holland et al (2009) to a multi-fuel setting where a regulator is uncertain about fuel CIs, and shows the welfare maximizing CI levels do not always correspond to the regulator's true expected value.…”
Section: Market Effects and Efficient Low-carbon Fuel Standardsmentioning
confidence: 99%