Essence and the inference problem

Abstract

Discussions about the nature of essence and about the inference problem for non-Humean theories of nomic modality have largely proceeded independently of each other. In this article I argue that the right conclusions to draw about the inference problem actually depend significantly on how best to understand the nature of essence. In particular, I argue that this conclusion holds for the version of the inference problem developed and defended by Alexander Bird. I argue that Bird's own argument that this problem is fatal for David Armstrong's influential theory of the laws of nature but not for dispositional essentialism is seriously flawed. In place of this argument, I develop an argument that whether Bird's inference problem raises serious difficulties for Armstrong's theory depends on the answers to substantial questions about how best to understand essence. The key consequence is that considerations about the nature of essence have significant, underappreciated implications for Armstrong's theory.

Second-order relations and nomic regularities

“…For example, they claim that 'precisely the same regress afflicts Bird's [...] theory ' (2012, 714), and that he is 'hoist by his own petard' (ibid., 720). This is plainly false (see Coates, 2019 for a related argument to the same conclusion). Bird's Ultimate Argument makes essential use of the reference to Armstrong's categoricalist ontology: it is because Armstrong refuses to admit non-trivial modal ties among properties that he cannot account for an entailment from any relationship of the form N(F,G) to the corresponding inclusion of Fs among the Gs.…”

“…For example, Barker and Smart are explicit (2012, 721) in suggesting that Bird might make use of brute necessities to establish entailments like (2). Similarly, Tugby (2012) offers a solution analogous to Coates's by advocating a 'Qualitative Dispositional Essentialism' (QDE) which imbues universals with an intrinsic quality that can determine regularities (see also Jacobs, 2011;Smith, 2016;Coates, 2019). Lastly, one might suppose that Schaffer's Axiomatic Solution could be used to stipulate that SR is a relation which ensures that the needed entailments hold.…”

The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature

“…Bird (2005) claims that the conflict with quidditism already arises as soon as (Necessary Implication) is endorsed. But asCoates (2019) points out, the conflict only arises if the essentialist claim is endorsed.…”