Essentialism, Power, and the Representation of Social Categories: A Folk Sociology Perspective

Abstract

This paper synthesizes two perspectives on essentialism: cognitive and social. The cognitive essentialist perspective argues that our bias to appeal to the psychological belief that categories have innate essences enables us to make inferences about social categories such as race, caste, and gender. The social essentialist perspective argues that essentialist thinking serves the needs of those in power to justify existing social and economic hierarchies. Examining the relationship between essentialism and power, this paper expands the framework for folk sociology, incorporating cognitive and social essentialist accounts to examine folk theories of social differences between caste, race, gender, and class, with a particular emphasis on social marginality and cultural narratives. Further, this paper discusses the relevance of the folk sociology perspective to the study of children’s emerging understanding of their social world.

Cultural transmission of social essentialism

“…For example, by age 7-10 y, children growing up in more politically conservative communities in the United States have more essentialist beliefs about race compared with children growing up in more politically liberal communities (19). In India, adults from upper social classes view class-based groups in essentialist terms, but adults from lower classes do not (25,26). Also, within Israel, essentialist beliefs about ethnicity are more common among older children in religious communities than among older children in secular communities (21).…”

Upper Classes and Immorality: Ecological Validation of 50 Years of Power Research

“…For example, Confucianism, the founding moral philosophy in many Asian societies, treats the respect for hierarchy and authority as its highest virtue, at the apex of morality (Markus & Kitayama, 1991;Nisbett, 2003). Studies in India (e.g., Mahalingam, 2007), among liberals and conservatives in the USA (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), or lower classes in Brazil and the USA (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Diaz, 1993), indicate various levels of moral concerns about purity, degradation, hierarchical deference and loyalty to a national or ethnic group. Although research on the ethology of mammalian species suggests empathy, respect for authority, and equity might have been inherited from our pre-human ancestors (de Waal, 1982(de Waal, , 2006, the relative importance given to each moral domain varies with social environment.…”

“…Members of the higher social classes tend to essentialize social categories and behaviors as inherent and stable, based on ingrained and genetic characteristics of individuals (Keller, 2005), while members of the lower classes tend to contextualize social categories and behaviors as flexible and constructed by social experience (Kraus, 2010;Mahalingam, 2003Mahalingam, , 2007. Thus, higher-class members tend to favor personal abilities and neglect social interconnectedness.…”

“…Ideologies that promote social hierarchy (e.g., social dominance) tend to support inequality in society at large, and thereby tend to promote and legitimate prejudices and discrimination (Sidanius et al, 2000). The inclination of upper-class members to validate and justify inequality in an essentialist manner further legitimates social inequality (Keller, 2005;Kraus, 2010;Mahalingam, 2003Mahalingam, , 2007. More directly, high SES is correlated to lower fairness/reciprocity: upper-class members are more selfish (Dubois, et al, 2015).…”

Competitive victimhood in response to accusations of ingroup harmdoing

“…These authors observe that while minority groups were once commonly labeled "deviant" and morally inferior, many minority groups now reject such labels to embrace the identity of morally entitled victims, an identity which gives them some cultural capital. For example, African Americans and Hindu Dalits ("untouchables") have a modern history of reinterpreting traditional theological narratives to equate their lower social status with higher moral standing (Mahalingam, 2007). At the same time, dominant groups once understood as "normative" are now commonly labeled guilty and immoral by virtue of their privileged status (see also Williams, 1993).…”