Essentialist Non-Reductivism

Abstract

According to many contemporary metaphysicians, we ought to theorize in terms of grounding because of its promise to explicate the idea of reality having a layered structure. However, a tension emerges when one combines the layered structure view with the view that higher-level facts are not reducible to lower level facts. This tension emerges from two problems. The first problem arises from the fact that grounding explanations entail true universal generalizations. In order to satisfy this constraint, we will face serious pressure to make sure the entities involved in the grounded facts are appropriately connected to the entities involved in the grounding facts, otherwise the generalizations associated with those grounding claims will come out false. However, ensuring the appropriate connections seemingly leaves no way for the non-reductivist to fully squeeze out reference to higher-level entities as we descend the levels of ground. This threatens the result that some higher-level facts must be taken as fundamental, which the non-reductivist cannot accept. I’ll argue that we can resolve the tension by taking the connections at issue to be essentially true. We can call this view essentialist non-reductivism. One significant upshot of the argument is that we can see not only that essentialist non-reductivism successfully resolves the tension, but that in principle no better solution could be offered.

Freedom's values: The good and the right

“…As Ralf Bader notes, this way of valuing freedom appeals to deontic reasons (concerning how persons have reason to treat one another) that prescind from well‐being and that are status‐based; in particular, such reasons count in favour of refraining from relevantly interfering with people's freedom in light of persons' status as purposive agents, as beings capable of setting ends (Bader, 2018 : section 4). A number of freedom theorists appeal to status‐based considerations (e.g., Lawless, 2018 ; Olsaretti, 2005 : 107). 2 By way of illustration, consider Kant's notion of freedom as “independence from being constrained by another's choice” (Kant, 1996 [1797]: 393).…”

“… 27 By “respect” I mean the attitude of refraining from relevantly interfering with people's freedom. Most plausibly, respect‐as‐attitude is also a component of the moral principle of respect for persons (e.g., Bader, 2018 : §4; Carter, 2009 ; Lawless, 2018 ; Pettit, 2015 : chap. 3).…”

“…For example, John Lawless observes that for theories of “negative liberty” – which in the present context can be equated with what I call Relational Freedom – “the special significance of the interpersonal manifests in the kinds of constraints that make a person unfree” ((Lawless, 2018 : 2) (i.e., in the fact that according to such theories only human constraints can be considered as unfreedom‐generating)) (see Lawless, 2018 : §2; Pettit, 2003 : 396). Lawless grounds the focus on “the interpersonal” on a more fundamental interest in respect as status recognition (Lawless, 2018 : §2) but then argues that theories of negative freedom ultimately fail to properly account for respect (Lawless, 2018 : §3).…”