Establishing a Continuum from Minimizing to Maximizing Bureaucrats: State Agency Head Preferences for Governmental Expansion—A Typology of Administrator Growth Postures, 1964–98

Abstract

Scholars have long suspected the blanket description of bureaucrats as "budget maximizers" is simplistic and inaccurate. This article provides empirical grounds for questioning that description and enhances our understanding of bureaucratic fiscal preferences. Bureaucratic preferences for expansion are distributed along a continuum. A typology of agency heads' expansion preferences is developed and related to Downs's typology of bureaucrats. Data from eight surveys of state agency heads (1964-98) enable us to trace administrators' preferences for expansion over four decades. These preferences vary substantially in any single survey year and reflect trends across these years. Notably, a substantial proportion of agency heads opted for no expansion in their own agency's programs and expenditures or in the state's overall budget. This typology challenges conventional conceptions of bureaucrats' maximizing preferences, advances alternative interpretations about budget minimizing, and fills an important gap in budget and bureaucracy theory.In few arenas of public administration are the conflicts, contentions, and competition more intense, subtle, and complex than in the arena of budgeting. Kettl (2003, 171) asserts that "budgeting is the nerve center of the political universe-and it can often seem that this center is in chaos." For the better part of the last four decades, budgets, budgeting, and budget theory have been pivot points in this chaos, around which reform, responsibility, accountability, performance, evaluations, and control have revolved.In this article, we describe the variety, variations, and distributions of budgetary preferences. We contend that a better understanding of budgeting behavior is possible if we can better grasp the preferences (goals) that promote actions. Budgetary preferences are relevant and significant variables in the budget process. By describing the diverse Cynthia J. Bowling is an assistant professor of political science at Auburn University. Her research focuses on public administrators, bureaucracy, and policy within the broader state and local government context. She is currently involved in research to identify and explain patterns of female representation in state agency head positions over the last four decades.

Public Agency External Analysis Using a Modified “Five Forces” Framework

“…Therefore, this observation is not a claim that agency managers are actually budget maximizers; on this, see Bowling, Cho, and Wright (2004) and Dolan (2002). Also, to emphasize this again, it does not necessarily mean that public managers cannot seek to achieve substantive normative goals.…”

Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets

“…As an increase in the national budget (which, in turn, is usually raised in times of high tax yields) is furthermore expected to be associated with an increase in agency budgets (or, at least, a lower probability that their requests for additional resources are denied) (Downs, 1967, ch. IX;Blais and Dion, 1990;Bowling et al, 2004;Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004, ch. 3), higher tax revenues might imply a better financial endowment of the regulatory authority, too.…”

“…Blais and Dion (1990) expect a bureaucratic self-interest to exist after (inter alia) reviewing the results of Krueger (1988), showing the number of applicants for U.S. federal jobs to increase when public compared to private wages increase, and Sigelman (1986), suggesting an eagerness for higher agency means to prevail among most American senior administrators. And finally, Bowling et al (2004) agency heads favoring higher expenditures for their own authority (which, according to Ryu et al (2007), strongly affects an office's request for a rising budget), but also that many of them likewise prefer a higher overall public spending. For Europe, Venetoklis and Kiander (2006) results suggest that Finnish higher-level officials especially advocate higher appropriations for tasks fulfilled by their agency, and also Bagdigen's (2003) interviews with Turkish local officials reveal a desire for budget expansions for their own authorities.…”

The “Revolt in Dullsville” Revisited: Lessons for Theory, Practice, and Research from the American State Administrators Project, 1964–2008

“…One was to fit preferences for expansion (or nonexpansion) into the typology of bureaucratic actors identified by Downs (1967) as “conservers” or “aggrandizers.” From a budgetary standpoint, “conservers” are agency heads who, when asked about agency budget expansion, opt for “no increase,” while aggrandizers prefer a budget expansion of “15 percent or more.” A second avenue of inquiry was to assess Niskanen's (1971) budget “maximizing bureaucrat” thesis (Bowling and Wright 1998; Sigelman 1986). This perspective ultimately produced a “minimizing–maximizing” continuum of fiscal aspirations among state executives (Bowling, Cho, and Wright 2004). A further feature of budget aspirations was explored.…”