1992
DOI: 10.1029/92wr01795
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Estimating an optimal distribution of water entitlements

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the distributive consequences of alternative methods of allocating transferable water licenses in Queensland, Australia. The equilibrium of a number of different cooperative games will be used to judge which method of initial allocation of water entitlements potentially produces the most equitable distribution of the income derived from regulated water.

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Cited by 46 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Their work examined the trade-offs among multiple objectives including economic efficiency, equity, ease of implementation and administration, along with environmental concerns. Tisdell and Harrison (1992) proposed a water market procedure using game theory. Their goal was to understand how regulatory agencies could allocate water to promote its equitable distribution.…”
Section: Allocation Of Water Releasesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their work examined the trade-offs among multiple objectives including economic efficiency, equity, ease of implementation and administration, along with environmental concerns. Tisdell and Harrison (1992) proposed a water market procedure using game theory. Their goal was to understand how regulatory agencies could allocate water to promote its equitable distribution.…”
Section: Allocation Of Water Releasesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This trade process to achieve a cooperative water allocation under certain water balance and hydrological constraints is essentially a cooperative water allocation game. The payoff vector is called an imputation to the cooperative game, and meets the conditions of individual rationality, group rationality and joint efficiency (Young et al, 1982;Tisdell & Harrison, 1992): Individual rationality: Individual and group rationality…”
Section: T T T I S I J T T T I S J U V S Nb S Nb Nbmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To achieve equitable and efficient water allocation requires the cooperation of all stakeholders in sharing water resources. Cooperative game theory can be utilized to study the fair allocation of common pool resources (Owen, 1995), and has been applied to the following types of problems in water resources management: (1) cost allocation of water resources development projects, including joint waste water treatment  * Corresponding author: lfang@ryerson.ca and disposal facilities (Giglio and Wrightington, 1972;Dinar and Howitt, 1997), and water supply development projects (Young et al, 1982;Driessen & Tijs, 1985;Harrington, 1990, 1991;Dinar et al, 1992;Lejano & Davos, 1995;Lippai & Heaney, 2000); (2) equitable allocation of waste loads to a common receiving medium Okada and Mikami, 1992); and (3) allocation of water rights (Tisdell & Harrison, 1992). There are only a limited number of models employing cooperative game theory in water allocation, and these models have none or else simple hydrological constraints.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Dales [10] explained the emission right market in detail and Krawczyk [11] utilized the coupling constraint game model to analyze emission distribution and production situations of only three participants in order to prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium for emission behaviors and get its solutions. Tisdell, Harrison [12], Becker [13] and Bielsa [14] took advantage of game model to imitate conflicts' non-cooperative and cooperative behaviors and distributed equally benefits brought by cooperation based on the comparison of different behavior benefits. Spullber et al [15] and Weber et al [16] believed accumulative effect is existed in pollutant transfer and diffusion.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%