2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00522.x
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Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and Discretion

Abstract: This paper explains US macroeconomic outcomes with an empirical new-Keynesian model in which monetary policy minimizes the central bank's loss function. The presence of expectations in the model forms a well-known distinction between two modes of optimization, termed commitment and discretion. I estimate the model separately under each policy using maximum likelihood over the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke period. Comparisons of fit reveal that the data favor the specification with discretionary policy. Estimates … Show more

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Cited by 41 publications
(19 citation statements)
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References 93 publications
(141 reference statements)
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“…Palma and Portugal (2011) used a standard new-Keynesian modelwith forward-looking expectations proposed by Givens (2010) to estimate the monetary authority's preferences in Brazilduring the inflation targeting regime, taking into account a closed economy. 2 Assuming rational expectations, it is necessary tomake a key distinction about how agents' expectations are dealt with in the optimization problem, i.e., by telling commitment and discretion apart.…”
Section: Introduction and Justification For The Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Palma and Portugal (2011) used a standard new-Keynesian modelwith forward-looking expectations proposed by Givens (2010) to estimate the monetary authority's preferences in Brazilduring the inflation targeting regime, taking into account a closed economy. 2 Assuming rational expectations, it is necessary tomake a key distinction about how agents' expectations are dealt with in the optimization problem, i.e., by telling commitment and discretion apart.…”
Section: Introduction and Justification For The Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“… See Favero and Rovelli (2003),Dennis (2006),Surico (2007),Ilbas (2012), andGivens (2012) 8 SeeChappell Jr, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1997) andMeade and Stasavage (2008).9 We demonstrate this point with a simple three-equation New Keynesian model in A.1. The point is demonstrated in more general models inRudebusch and Svensson (1999),Dennis (2006), andSurico (2007) …”
mentioning
confidence: 56%
“…Using maximum likelihood, Givens () estimates a New Keynesian optimal monetary policy model for the USA. The model is estimated separately under the two alternatives of commitment and discretion, using quarterly data over the Volcker–Greenspan–Bernanke era; a comparison of the log‐likelihood of the two alternative models based on a Bayesian information criterion (to overcome the fact that the two models are nonnested) strongly favors discretion over commitment.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%