Estimating Conditional Probabilities of Terrorist Attacks: Modeling Adversaries with Uncertain Value Tradeoffs

Levine, E. S.

doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01655.x

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In order to evaluate the terrorists’ decision to attack based on attribute preference, swing weights (

w_{j k}

) are introduced (Rosoff & John, 2009). Swing weights, quantified on a scale of 0–1, are assessed using generalized beta distributions to represent the analyst's uncertainty about the terrorists’ value tradeoffs (Levine, 2012; Paté‐Cornell & Guikema, 2002). A concave function is used to reflect the risk averse attitude of the terrorist,

U {(X_{k})}_{j}

(Equation ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of a Potential Facility Risk Index for Radiological Security

Rane

Harris

2020

Risk Analysis

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Given the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism, it is imperative to understand and evaluate the security risk of radioactive sources. In this context, risk assessment is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Currently, no broad risk index exists for radiological facilities, such as healthcare centers and universities. This study aims to develop and demonstrate a methodology to compute a potential facility risk index (PFRI) based on a probable loss event (LE) and loss magnitude (LM) resulting from a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack. The threat component of the PFRI is devised as a utility function weighing the threat group attributes and RDD radioactive material preference. The principles of probabilistic risk assessment and pathway analysis are implemented to account for RDD radioactive material theft probabilities in different attack scenarios. Locational hazards and nuclear security culture are measured as a function of radiological facility vulnerability for LE. The LM of the attack, in the form of loss of life and economic damage, is then estimated to construct the PFRI. The methodology is applied to a hypothetical healthcare facility with a single radioactive material asset. For this example, the PFRI resulted in a value of 2.0 (on a scale of 1–10), showing low risk to the facility. The development of the PFRI provides a risk analysis tool that may be useful in making decisions for radiological security improvements.

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“…In order to evaluate the terrorists’ decision to attack based on attribute preference, swing weights (

w_{j k}

U {(X_{k})}_{j}

(Equation ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of a Potential Facility Risk Index for Radiological Security

Rane

Harris

2020

Risk Analysis

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“…Additionally, it is possible that the model of the terrorist's decision making does not cover all vulnerabilities in the system. We will investigate this important aspect to identify an approach that aids the decision makers and explains the mechanisms and strategies of the attackers [29][30][31][32].…”

Section: Threat Likelihood Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Decision Framework for Managing the Risk of Terrorist Threats at Rail Stations Interconnected with Airports

Kaewunruen

Alawad

Cotruta

2018

Safety

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This paper highlights a risk-based decision-making framework on a basis of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Its aim is to enable stakeholders of transport infrastructures to systematically and effectively allocate their limited resources and consequently improve resilience when facing the potential risk of a terrorist attack. The potential risk of a terrorist attack affects the inter-operation of transportation infrastructures including airports and rail stations, the regional economy, and imposes additional costs of security or any countermeasures. This novel framework is thus established in order to model the security system, to consider a multitude of threat scenarios, and to assess the decisions and choices taken by the aggressors during various stages of their attack. The framework has capability to identify the state of partial neutralization, which reveals the losses incurred when the terrorist could not reach the primary target. In this study, an underground railway station interconnected to an international airport has been used as a case study to demonstrate the effectiveness of this novel framework. By the rigorous assessment of potential losses during a variety of threat scenarios, four countermeasures that could minimise losses are proposed: screening of passengers by observation techniques (SPOT), a surveillance system, increase of the cargo screening rate, and blast-resistant cargo containers. The cost and efficiency assessment is employed to determine the most suitable countermeasures when the value of the security measures equal their cost. Note that ongoing research is still needed to establish better countermeasures since there is no end to the creativity of terrorists. The new technology, such as wireless sensors, will play an important role in the security system in the future. In particular, this study will help insurance and rail industries to model and manage risk profiles at critical infrastructure.

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“…Many factors associated with IED threats and vulnerability are grouped into this category, primarily because of their diversity -of motive, design, manufacture and response -and that they are derived from issues pertaining to human factors. The utility, and also the flaw, regarding the use of expert opinion is that you gain the experience of the individual -something of limited utility in an environment depending on the preferences of an unpredictable adversary (Levine, 2012). Assuming that the experience and information that an expert retains is relevant to the case under consideration, all expert opinion remains subjective (Taylor-Adams and Kirwan, 1997) introducing the opportunity for bias and prejudice into assessments (Forester et al, 2003;Koblentz, 2011) in addition to significant variability between experts (Firmino et al, 2006;Park and Lee, 2008).…”

Section: Challenges For Pra For Ied Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

A systems model for probabilistic risk assessment of improvised explosive device attacks

Grant

Stewart

2012

IJIDSS

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Due to their improvised nature, the variability in the design, manufacture and operation of most improvised explosive devices (IEDs) defy the traditional paradigms used to assess the effectiveness of conventional munitions. Thus, IEDs are complex socio-technical systems to model. To compensate for inadequacies in model design or data deficiencies, expert judgement and subjective probability assignments are often employed. The paper aims to reduce this reliance by developing an IED probabilistic risk assessment model using a systems model for IED attacks based on IED device reliability and characterising the human aspects of IED attack operational effectiveness from existing terrorism databases. This model can then be used to develop an automated model for IED probabilistic risk assessment that can be used towards informing military applications such as operations planning and war-gaming, and civil applications such as security risk management (including event planning), protective construction requirements, and insurance assessments. It was found that the risk of loss (fatalities, property damage) is influenced more by operational aspects (such as target selection, IED placement and attack timing) than the technical aspects of the device design and manufacture.

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Estimating Conditional Probabilities of Terrorist Attacks: Modeling Adversaries with Uncertain Value Tradeoffs

Cited by 5 publications

References 24 publications

Development of a Potential Facility Risk Index for Radiological Security

Development of a Potential Facility Risk Index for Radiological Security

A Decision Framework for Managing the Risk of Terrorist Threats at Rail Stations Interconnected with Airports

A systems model for probabilistic risk assessment of improvised explosive device attacks

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