Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach

Yushkov, A. N.; Hu, Yingyao; Shum, Matthew

doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2010.02.002

Cited by 75 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(35 reference statements)

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“…Crawford, Vincent P and Nagore Iriberri, "Level- An et al (2010) and An (2010), and thus omitted here. LetB b 3 w 2 ,τ 2 be the estimated eigenvector matrix, we estimate the conditional density f (b 2 τ 2 ) from the joint density f (b 2 , τ 2 ) and the probability distribution Pr(τ 2 ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Properties of the estimators can be proved by standard methods and we refer interested reader to An (2010) and An et al (2010) for details. Table 3: Reduced-form analysis of subjects' contributing behavior: by period…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As argued in An (2010), the rank of this matrix can be used to identify the number of types under two conditions: first, the support of τ t does not change along with t; second, contribution distribution of any type is not a linear combination of those for other types. We employ this insight here and make the following assumption.…”

Section: Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Estimating private provision of public goods with heterogenous participants: a structural analysis

Yushkov

Liu

2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper estimates a structural model of private provision of public goods to provide some new empirical evidence on individuals' strategic contributing behaviors. In the model, individuals' contributing behaviors are allowed to be heterogenous and time-varying. We show that all the main components of the model including the number of different contributing strategies, functional form for each strategy, and how individuals adjust their strategies are identified from the revealed contribution choices of individuals. Further, the structural model is estimated using the data collected in a threshold public good experiment. The empirical results suggest that subjects in our experiment employ three contributing strategies, and they strategically respond to provision history by adjusting their preceding behavior. In addition, the response is heterogenous and dependent on subjects' contributing strategies. Terms of use: Documents in JEL Classification: H41, C14Keywords: Public Goods, Private Provision, Measurement Errors, Unobserved Heterogeneity, Nonparametric Identification and Estimation, Experimental Data. * We are grateful to Alex Brown, Catherine Eckel, and Daniel Stephenson for their helpful comments and discussions. The authors would like to thank Enago (www.enago.com) for the English language review. All errors are our own.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Estimating private provision of public goods with heterogenous participants: a structural analysis

Yushkov

Liu

2015

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“…The equalities c k = c k follow from equation (2). It remains to show that G (c k ) = G (c k ) for any k ≥ 1.…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Our estimate of the search cost distribution shows that consumers have either quite high or quite low search costs. 2 Consumers with high search costs do not compare prices and this gives substantial market power to the firms; as a result, estimated price-cost margins are significantly larger than what one would expect on the basis of the observed large number of firms operating in each market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semi‐nonparametric Estimation of Consumer Search Costs

González

Sándor

Wildenbeest

2012

J of Applied Econometrics

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This paper studies the estimation of the cost of non-sequential search. We provide a new method based on semi-nonparametric (SNP) estimation that allows us to pool price data from different consumer markets with the same underlying search cost distribution but different valuations or selling costs. We show that pooling data from different markets increases the number of estimated critical search cost cutoffs at all quantiles of the search cost distribution, which increases the precision of the estimates. A Monte Carlo study shows that the method works well in small samples. We apply our method to a data set of online prices for memory chips and find that the search cost density is essentially bimodal such that a large fraction of consumers searches very little, while a smaller fraction of consumers samples a relatively large number of stores.

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Nonparametric estimation of English auctions with selective entry: An application to online judicial auctions

Liu,

2023

International Studies of Economics

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This paper proposes an estimation approach following the constructive identification strategy of Athey and Haile, and Gentry and Li with adaption in the context of ascending auctions with selective entry. Our estimators are shown to be consistent in a large sample and to perform well in a finite sample by a simulation study. We apply our estimation approach to the Alibaba online judicial auctions of used cars to recover the bounds of conditional value distribution and the entry cost. The bounds estimates of both conditional value distribution and entry cost are quite tight (resp., relatively wide) for middle‐valued (resp., low‐valued or high‐valued) signal, and the cumulative distribution functions of conditional value distribution given signal comply with the law of ordered dominance. Finally, our counterfactual analysis indicates that (i) the ascending auction yields a higher revenue than the first‐price sealed bid auction, and (ii) the revenue can be improved significantly when the entry cost is cut by half.

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Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach

Cited by 75 publications

References 29 publications

Estimating private provision of public goods with heterogenous participants: a structural analysis

Estimating private provision of public goods with heterogenous participants: a structural analysis

Semi‐nonparametric Estimation of Consumer Search Costs

Nonparametric estimation of English auctions with selective entry: An application to online judicial auctions

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