Estimating Free-Riding Behavior: The StratAM Model

Steinwand, Martin C.

doi:10.1093/pan/mpr026

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Some people say we can't afford to engage in international development, but we can't afford not to' (quoted in Grice, 2011). 11 For two analyses of the problem of delivering global public goods with specific reference to international aid contributions, see Steinwand (2011) and Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006). 12 Of course, real-world democratic regimes do not produce exactly the results one might expect them to on paper.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But in normal circumstances a reasonable assurance in this regard can only be given if there is a binding rule effectively enforced... The need for the enforcement of rules by the state will still exist even when everyone is moved by the same sense of justice (1999 [1971], 236) 11 For two analyses of the problem of delivering global public goods with specific reference to international aid contributions see Steinwand, 2011;Mascarenhas and Sandler, 2006. 'Binding rule effectively enforced' is thought necessary because the internalisation of a particular sense of justice and willingness to act upon it does not and cannot itself bring with it an assurance that others are similarly motivated and willing. Indeed, in order for collective action problems to be reliably solved without the aid of institutional coercion, a deep level of relationship, of genuine friendship, seems to be required (Majolo et al, 2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

“… 11 For two analyses of the problem of delivering global public goods with specific reference to international aid contributions, see Steinwand (2011) and Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006). …”

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Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government

Ulaş

2016

Political Studies

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Cosmopolitans, if they are interested in seeing their principles realised, must hope that persons worldwide can become motivated to act in accordance with what those principles demand. But although it is important that genuinely moral motives are developed, we should not ignore the potential pragmatic value of self-interested motives to the realisation of cosmopolitan ends. This article considers three such motives: economic self-interest, prudent self-interest and democratic self-interest. I argue that in each case, usefully harnessing these motivations implies or requires global political integration that amounts to 'world government'. This argument has the effect of reinforcing the already popular view that realising cosmopolitan principles entails global political integration. For those who already endorse that view, my argument will act as supporting evidence; by contrast it represents a challenge to those cosmopolitans who have remained ambivalent about, or indeed have explicitly rejected, the need for global political integration.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government

Ulaş

2016

Political Studies

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“…. SeeSandler and Arce 2007;Mascarenhas and Sandler 2006;Olson and Zeckhauser 1966;Bermeo, Leblang, and Tingley 2011;and Steinwand 2011. Compete or Coordinate? Aid Fragmentation and Lead Donorship 449…”

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confidence: 99%

Compete or Coordinate? Aid Fragmentation and Lead Donorship

Steinwand¹

2015

Int Org

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Donor proliferation and the fragmentation of aid delivery is an important problem besetting foreign aid policy. Increased donor coordination is widely seen as a fix to this problem. This article explores theoretically and empirically the collective action problems and incentives that donors face when coordinating their actions, based on the distinction between private and public goods properties of aid. I introduce the concept of lead donorship, develop a measure that accounts for the exclusive and long-lasting ties between a lead donor and a recipient country, and show that lead donorship is in long-term decline. I test my theory combining spatial autoregressive (SAR) models, nonparametric model discrimination techniques, and data on aid delivery channels. I recover evidence of collusion in the provision of private goods aid in the presence of a lead donor, and lack of coordination and competition in the absence of a lead donor.

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“…We draw on recent work analyzing the provision of local public goods (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007;Galeotti et al, 2010;Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours, 2014;Siegel, 2009;Metternich et al, 2013;Steinwand, 2011). Using the analytic framework provided by Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours (2014), we formalize these considerations in a simple 3 See 'power to resist' in Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) and Conrad et al (2019).…”

Section: Fighting Durationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A network approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars

Metternich¹,

Wucherpfennig²

2019

Preprint

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Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actorcentric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized until the end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil, power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategic complements that dominate duration dynamics in multiactor conflicts. Based on a network game theoretic model, we derive a spatial econometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive, but partially offset in secessionist conflicts where the public goods nature of the incompatibility also induces strategic substitution effects.Date: February 25, 2020 Version 2.01. We are indebted to Jude Hays for initial hints and inspiration on the setup of the statistical model. We thank Lars-

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Estimating Free-Riding Behavior: The StratAM Model

Cited by 7 publications

References 44 publications

Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government

Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government

Compete or Coordinate? Aid Fragmentation and Lead Donorship

A network approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars

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