Estimating market power by introducing a new Lerner index in the Iranian electricity market

Nazemi, Ali; Farsaei, Anahita; Moghaddam, shadi khalil

doi:10.1080/15567249.2015.1137997

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Market power could not be confirmed based on the results. Nazemi et al (2016) studied the Iranian market, which differs from the Nordic market since the pay-as-bid system is used, instead of the Nordic system with a common market clearing price for all producers. Therefore, a new form of Lerner index was developed to suit the Iranian market.…”

Section: Studies On Market Power On Electricity Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wind power impact on market power on the Finnish electricity market

Hansson

Farsaei

Syri

2020

2020 17th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)

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Energy is a fascinating subject to study. Not only is the whole energy industry undergoing a historical transition, but the problems we face require knowledge in both technology, economics and social sciences, which makes them both interesting and demanding. I feel privileged to have been able to combine all these aspects in my studies and to be part of the energy transition that is going on in the world. To be able to combine these perspec-Thesis as well has been a cherry on top. I want to thank my supervisor, Professor Sanna Syri, for providing me the opportunity to study this interesting topic and letting me be part of the Energy Efficiency and Systems group at Aalto University. Thank you Sanna for your valuable comments and words of encouragement. I also want to thank my advisor Anahita Farsaei for all the tips and support along the way. Thank you Ana for sharing your knowledge about market power indices and making me question my calculations. All my other colleagues at Aalto deserve a thank you as well. Thank you, especially Ville, for helping me with the data for the Lerner index and thank you Tiia for all the discussions and great lunch company. As this thesis marks the end of my studies, I want to thank all of you that have made my years at Aalto and in Otaniemi both many and unforgettable. Without all the amazing people I have met, I would probably have graduated a lot quicker, but many life lessons and fun experiences shorter. After all, the courses can only teach you so much. So thank you Teknologföreningen for letting me bear responsibility and for being a home, thank you for all the Friday laughs and bubbles, the sorts of things that keep you going. Thank you Phux 15 for letting me be your Phuxivator and FTMK for making me Feel so welcome over the language barrier in Otaniemi. Thank you Laulikki Äpy and everyone at Rektorsgatan 1 for all the fun times, and not without a reason. Lastly, I want to thank my family, grandparents and everyone else who have supported me through the years. Thank you Mamma and Pappa for always believing in me. I always knew I could do it, thanks for you always knowing it too. And finally, thank you Markus for being by my side all along.

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Section: Studies On Market Power On Electricity Marketsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wind power impact on market power on the Finnish electricity market

Hansson

Farsaei

Syri

2020

2020 17th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)

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“…Recently, empirical evidence of the existence of oligopsony market power was shown by Bigerna and Bollino (2016). A recent analysis of the critical aspects of the electricity market performance is given in Sapio and Spagnolo (2020) and Yang and Sharma (2020), with specific reference to market power in Bask et al (2011), Nazemi et al (2016) and Pham (2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new design for market power monitoring in the electricity market. A simulation for Italy

et al. 2022

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The liberalization of electricity markets has been dominated by conditions of oligopoly and market power, as shown in numerous studies in empirical literature on the supply side. However, regulators have used statistical measurements to monitor the extent of market power, making little reference to founded theoretical approaches. This paper provides a new contribution to the literature on the electricity market by presenting a theoretical and empirical model to construct competitive equilibrium, and estimating market power on both the supply and demand side of the day-ahead electricity market. We implement an accurate measurement of the welfare loss associated with non-competitive market conditions, based on ex-ante demand and supply behavior.This model provides a useful analytical tool for regulators and policy-makers in order to implement pro-competitive regulation. We perform an empirical simulation to show the effects of non-competitive equilibria on the Italian hourly markets over the period 2013–2014. In an ideal competitive market, prices would be lower than historical prices by about 2–5% and quantities would be higher by about 0.5–1%.

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“…In order to improve the efficiency of bidding, scholars have proposed linear or second bidding [9], multi-level bidding [10], two-stage bidding strategy [11] and so on. Nazemi et al [12] pointed out that in an on-demand auction, the marginal cost is no longer applicable and the Lerner index can be used for competitive bidding. Taking into account the bilateral bidding behaviour in the market, Moutinho et al [13] combined cointegration analysis and causality analysis with the extended Cournot model, and Saez-Gallego et al [14] considered pricesensitive electricity consumer groups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nazemi et al. [12] pointed out that in an on‐demand auction, the marginal cost is no longer applicable and the Lerner index can be used for competitive bidding. Taking into account the bilateral bidding behaviour in the market, Moutinho et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bidding strategy of thermal power compound differential evolution game under the market mechanism of peak regulation auxiliary service

Dong

et al. 2021

IET Generation Trans & Dist

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As the main provider of peak regulation auxiliary services, thermal power units are particularly important to ensure their revenue in an uncertain environment. To obtain the optimal bidding strategy for thermal power units, a thermal power peak regulation bidding model based on the Northeast Power Grid's auxiliary service market bidding mechanism is established. Secondly, the evolutionary game theory is introduced into the bidding strategy of thermal power units. Meanwhile, in order to solve the multi-party game problem, a compound differential evolution game algorithm is constructed to solve the two-tiers bidding. Finally, based on the actual operating data of a typical day, the efficiency of the compound differential evolution game algorithm bidding strategy is verified, and the bidding strategy of thermal power units in different situations is discussed. The results show that when all units participate in peak regulation, the first-tier quotation is an optimal strategy at 0.19 yuan kWh −1 and below, and the second-tier quotation is distributed between 0.6-0.8 yuan kWh −1. When only some units are involved in peak regulation, the first-tier quotation of thermal power units adopts a high price strategy, mostly at 0.3 yuan kWh −1 , and the second-tier quotation is still based on a high price strategy.

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Estimating market power by introducing a new Lerner index in the Iranian electricity market

Cited by 5 publications

References 4 publications

Wind power impact on market power on the Finnish electricity market

Wind power impact on market power on the Finnish electricity market

A new design for market power monitoring in the electricity market. A simulation for Italy

Bidding strategy of thermal power compound differential evolution game under the market mechanism of peak regulation auxiliary service

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