We find positive contemporaneous, short-, and long-run effects of an increase in the acquisition rate on management compensation. A positive bidirectional causality exists between acquisition frequency and management compensation. A higher firm value is likely to associate with higher acquisition frequency. Acquisition rate has a positive impact on the market share. Acquirers with lower market share are more likely to become frequent acquirers. A causal order follows from lower market share to higher acquisition frequency to higher firm value to higher management compensation. The impact of acquisition frequency on management compensation is higher for value-enhancing acquirers relative to value-destroying acquirers.for good (value-enhancing) acquirers but does not change for bad (value-destroying) acquirers. However, Harford and Li (2007) show CEO compensation is insensitive to acquirer performance. Avery, Chevalier, and Schaefer (1998) show no significant difference in CEO's equity compensation between acquirers and nonacquirers. Avery et al. find no difference in the relation between CEO compensation and acquisition decisions for both good and bad acquirers. Moreover, Guest (2009) find a transitory positive effect of an