Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas

Rausser, Gordon C.; Freebairn, John

doi:10.2307/1924459

Cited by 62 publications

(37 citation statements)

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“…Single-country PPFs have been utilized in several studies. For example, Rausser and Freebairn (1974) used a PPF to analyze US beef import policy, and analyzed the effects of beef trade policy on the welfare of consumers in terms of the cost of a basket of meat commodities. Oehmke and Yao (1990) estimated a policy preference function that explains the US government's choice of target prices, the levels of government-held wheat stocks, and the level of public wheat research funding for the US wheat market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Atıcı

2005

J Prod Anal

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This study determines the perceived weights of various producer groups by policy makers in selected sectors (wheat, corn, sugar, beef and veal, and milk), for both the US and the EU, from 1980 to 2000, in five-year intervals. Results show that the US’s weights deviate less than the EU’s, compared with the external protections, indicating that the lobbying efforts of interest groups in the US are reflected more closely in external policy design, and are therefore more efficient than those in the EU. Game simulation suggests that it is in the best interest of both blocs to choose the status quo action among various trade liberalization scenarios with the latest calculated weights. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005weight efficiency, lobbying, political preferences, bilateral agricultural trade,

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Atıcı

2005

J Prod Anal

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“…Often, the political power of producers imputed by policies is assessed in the context of political equilibrium between interest groups, as in Krueger (1974) and Zusman (1976). The political equilibrium attained by policies has often been explored using the policy preference function, as in Rausser and Freebairn (1974), Gardner (1987), Beghin and Foster (1992), Buccola and Sukume (1993), and Dutt and Mitra (2005). 1 In the policy preference function approach, the implementation of policy is understood as the regulator's decision to maximize a weighted social welfare.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In this context, studies assess political power using the welfare weights imputed by the observed level of policy. Notable examples include Rausser and Freebairn (1974), Gardner (1987) and several articles surveyed in de Gorter and Swinnen (2002). However, these studies do not address the link between the implemented levels of policy and market power, and do not consider politically created market power.…”

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confidence: 99%

Political Market Power Reflected in Milk Pricing Regulations

Ahn

Sumner

2009

American J Agri Economics

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We investigate revealed political market power reflected in the pattern of price discrimination by end use that is the hallmark of U.S. milk marketing orders. We show that the pattern of prices that would maximize producer profits, if producers operated a cartel with monopoly power in a regional market, is far above actual government-set price differentials between milk used for fluid products and that used for manufactured products. The pattern of actual price differentials is consistent with political welfare weights for producers relative to consumers that are small compared to the weights that would yield maximum producer profits.

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“…Empirical work began in this area with Rausser and Freebairn (1974) who estimated political preference weights under the U.S. beef import quota. Other empirical studies that analyzed political aspects for commodity markets include Paarlberg and Abbott (1986), Oehmke and Yao (1990), Baffes (1993), and Im (1999).…”

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A Political Economic Analysis of U.S. Rice Export Programs to Japan and South Korea: A Game Theoretic Approach

Lee

Kennedy

2007

American J Agri Economics

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The Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture (UR) has contributed to the increase in U.S. and world rice trade since 1994. Despite this, the Japanese and Korean rice markets continue to be characterized by high levels of trade intervention. This paper attempts to analyze both import markets incorporating econometric estimates and public choice theory in a game theoretic framework. Various scenarios are analyzed. The results show that the overall Nash equilibrium occurs with a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under the U.S. Market Development Program, which includes the Market Access Program and Foreign Market Development Program. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

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Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas

Cited by 62 publications

References 1 publication

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Weight Perception and Efficiency Loss in Bilateral Trading: The Case of US and EU Agricultural Policies

Political Market Power Reflected in Milk Pricing Regulations

A Political Economic Analysis of U.S. Rice Export Programs to Japan and South Korea: A Game Theoretic Approach

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