Estimation of Safe Sensor Measurements of Autonomous System Under Attack

Dutta, Raj Gautam; Guo, Xiaolong; Zhang, Teng; Kwiat, Kevin; Kamhoua, Charles A.; Njilla, Laurent; Jin, Yier

doi:10.1145/3061639.3062241

Cited by 34 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…As a side note, we would like to emphasize that using the proposed physical layer cyberattack detection system implemented at the firmware level, together with a prediction based cyberattack detector implemented at higher layers may result improved cyberattack resilience. As a related work, we also would like to cite References [16,17] where a modulation based PyCRA system is proposed. Although the techniques developed in References [15][16][17] are applicable to many different sensors, they are all based on turning of the sensor's physical output signal off at random instants/periods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a related work, we also would like to cite References [16,17] where a modulation based PyCRA system is proposed. Although the techniques developed in References [15][16][17] are applicable to many different sensors, they are all based on turning of the sensor's physical output signal off at random instants/periods. For better cyberattack detection, sensor's physical output must be turned on for shorter and randomly selected periods of time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor

Toker

Alsweiss

2020

Electronics

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In this paper, we propose a novel 77 GHz automotive radar sensor, and demonstrate its cyberattack resilience using real measurements. The proposed system is built upon a standard Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar RF-front end, and the novelty is in the DSP algorithm used at the firmware level. All attack scenarios are based on real radar signals generated by Texas Instruments AWR series 77 GHz radars, and all measurements are done using the same radar family. For sensor networks, including interconnected autonomous vehicles sharing radar measurements, cyberattacks at the network/communication layer is a known critical problem, and has been addressed by several different researchers. What is addressed in this paper is cyberattacks at the physical layer, that is, adversarial agents generating 77 GHz electromagnetic waves which may cause a false target detection, false distance/velocity estimation, or not detecting an existing target. The main algorithm proposed in this paper is not a predictive filtering based cyberattack detection scheme where an “unusual” difference between measured and predicted values triggers an alarm. The core idea is based on a kind of physical challenge-response authentication, and its integration into the radar DSP firmware.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor

Toker

Alsweiss

2020

Electronics

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“…In [16], [17], physical-layer attacks on automotive radar sensors are discussed. The first one is based on estimators and the second one is based on a technique called spatiotemporal challenge-response (STCR) which does not depend on an estimation model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a good engineering design, both physicallayer and communication layer (if exists) attack detectors should be used to improve safety and reliability. In this work, we focus on physical-layer attacks described in [2], and our approach is inspired by [16], [18]. Finally, the author would like to cite [19]- [21] as related published results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical-Layer Cyberattack and Interference Resilient Automotive Radars

Toker

2020

IEEE Access

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In this paper, we present a physical-layer attack and interference resilient automotive radar system, and derive analytical upper bounds for the probability of not detecting an attack, and the probability of false attack alarm. We consider a quite general attack model and prove that if the attack signal level is above a defined relative threshold, both the probability of false attack alarm and the probability of not detecting an attack converge to zero exponentially with the number of samples acquired during a single chirp, and the number of chirps used in a frame. We also derive an analytical formula for this relative threshold, and prove that by selecting shorter frame durations, and using lower noise RF equipment, the threshold can be made as small as possible. Basically, by proper selection of radar parameters arbitrarily small attack signals can be detected almost always with almost no false alarms. We also present a numerical example using real measured data obtained from two 77 GHz automotive radars operated at the same time. Also using real data, we show that the proposed system reduces the negative effects of undetected weak attacks which are below the above mentioned threshold.

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“…Under the real-time MCU control, the replica-radar quickly synchronizes with the target radar to provide distance-spoofing capability. This kind of radar spoofing attack has been studied so far only in either simulations or low-frequency model-based studies [1][2][3]. Other related works [4,5] only focus on how to make object electro-magnetically invisible by using an EM absorber.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Low-Cost Replica-Based Distance-Spoofing Attack on mmWave FMCW Radar

Miura

Machida

Matsuda

et al. 2019

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Attacks and Solutions in Hardware Security Workshop

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This paper presents a low-cost distance-spoofing attack on a mmWave Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar. It uses only a replica radar chipset and a single compact microcontroller board both in mass production. No expensive and bulky test instrument is required, and hence a low-cost and lightweight attack setup is developed. Even with the limited hardware resource in this setup, the replica radar can be precisely synchronized with the target radar for distance-spoofing capability. A half-chirp modulation scheme enables timing compensation between crystal oscillators on the replica and the target radar boards. A two-step delay insertion scheme precisely controls relative delay difference between two radars at ns-order, and as a result the attacker can manipulate distance measured at target radar with only around ±10m ranging error. This demonstrates potential feasibility of low-cost malicious attack on the commercial FMCW radar as a physical security threat. A countermeasure employing randomchirp modulation is proposed and its security level is evaluated under the proposed attack for secure and safe radar ranging.

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Estimation of Safe Sensor Measurements of Autonomous System Under Attack

Cited by 34 publications

References 6 publications

Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor

Design of a Cyberattack Resilient 77 GHz Automotive Radar Sensor

Physical-Layer Cyberattack and Interference Resilient Automotive Radars

A Low-Cost Replica-Based Distance-Spoofing Attack on mmWave FMCW Radar

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