Eternity

Abstract

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Timelessness and divine agency

“…II If Pike's argument is the one I have ascribed to him, then he is saddled with the arduous task of defending the necessary truth of premise (2). However, there is no need for such a defense, because, as I shall now show, it follows directly from the concept of eternity that an eternal God cannot bring it about that a temporal object comes into existence.…”

“…Since this seems correct, I shall begin with a closer look at (2). Because Pike's argument is supposed to establish that (1) entails that God is not timeless, (2) must be necessarily true.…”

“…But this would take us far off course from the present discussion. To do so would be to take seriously what I shall deny: For from the claim that an eternal entity brings it about that something comes into existence at T, it does not follow, they would emphasize, that that eternal entity does anything at T. Hence, it is begging the question against the timelessness of God to appeal to (P3) or to have a premise like (2) in an argument for the conclusion that God is not eternal. I will not pause to consider the adequacy of this response, for I hope to show that premise (2) of Pike's argument, and the defense of it, is a red herring, and that Pike's objection may be sustained without appeal to any controversial claim about the nature of direct action.…”

“…Thus, if something is produced or created, it has a position in time.l~ (P3) entails premise (2) of Pike's argument. And if (P3) is necessarily true, then so is(2). Hence, if (P3) is necessarily true, then Pike's argument establishes that a timeless God cannot create or produce anything temporal.Well, is (P3) a necessary truth?…”

The Simplicity of the Living God: Aquinas, Barth, and Some Philosophers

“…54 Stump and Kretzmann's characterization of eternity as a static, timeless present builds on their work in an earlier essay. 55 There the focus is the definition of eternity presented by Boethius, defended by Aquinas, "the complete possession all at once of illimitable life". 56 Yet their treatment of God as if God were a being is evident in the first problem the essay tackles.…”