This paper addresses a central positive claim in Matti Eklund's Choosing Normative Concepts: that a certain kind of metaphysically ambitious realist about normativity -the ardent realist -is committed to the metasemantic idea that the distinctive inferential role of normative concepts suffices to fix the extension of those concepts. I argue first that commitment to this sort of inferential role metasemantic view does nothing to secure ardent realism. I then show how the ardent realist can address Eklund's leading challenge without appeal to distinctively metasemantic commitments. * I am indebted for helpful discussion of related ideas to participants and the audience at the Pacific APA symposium on Choosing Normative Concepts (where a distant ancestor of this paper was presented) to participants in my graduate seminar Normative Realism and Normative Authority, to Derek Baker, Matt Bedke, Billy Dunaway, David Plunkett, and especially to Matti himself.