Ethical Quandaries in War Zones, When Mass Atrocity Prevention Fails

Abstract

Humanitarians are no longer necessarily viewed as selfless angels in war zones. Their motivations and mastery, their principles and products are questioned from inside and outside of the community of aid and protection agencies. Like the poor, war victims will always be with us. Coming to their rescue requires understanding of the ongoing transformations to contemporary humanitarian action in wars and the evolution of humanitarian culture – its values, language and behavior. An agreed culture of cooperation has given way to a contested one of competition resulting from militarization, politicization and marketization. Preventing mass atrocities is preferable to halting them; but the record of preventing them has been dismal. And even with sufficient political will to act or react, the history of postintervention results also has been abysmal. When mass atrocity prevention fails, a ‘learning culture’ is required: more responsible reflection and less rapid reaction. Traditional principles are unhelpful; guidance to effective action does not require strict adherence to humanitarian ideology but rather to considered calculations about least worst options.

Challenges to ethical obligations and humanitarian principles in conflict settings: a systematic review

“…For instance, a lack of interorganizational information sharing (Haver 2016) or an inability to attain necessary information due to operational restrictions (Bernthal et al 2014) could make it more difficult to manage material and personnel resources when delivering aid. Financially, for example, external constraints related to the need to maintain relationships with existing and future donors (Cobey et al 1993;Gastineau Campos and Farmer 2003;Haver 2016;MacCormack 2007;Weiss 2016) and internal constraints related to the need to sustain existing programs and staff (Michael and Zwi 2002) could affect organizations' abilities to adjust resource management nimbly in response to ever-changing circumstances (Clarinval and Biller-Andorno 2014;Hurst et al 2009;Leaning et al 2011). The inability to recruit and retain skilled individuals can require organizations to fill essential staffing gaps with unqualified or untrained individuals (Fouad et al 2017)-an action that could present a challenge to the provision of high-quality care.…”

“…Supporting a locally-led response is an obligation based on the idea of fair decision-making processes. The collapse of in-country health systems (Al-Moujahed et al 2017;de Waal 2010;Michael and Zwi 2002); difficulty in identifying and trusting local leaders (Black 2003;Cobey et al 1993;Fouad et al 2017;Haver 2016;Weiss 2016); and tensions arising between organizational, individual, and local beliefs and norms (Civaner et al 2017;Egeland et al 2011;Fegley 2009;Fraser et al 2015) all make fulfilling this obligation challenging.…”

“…Humanitarian organizations operating in resource scarce settings can also be perceived as lacking neutrality because of how they allocate resources and maintain secure access to those in need. Organizations can inadvertently or unwittingly become affiliated with other political objectives, for example, if they capitalize upon access gained by other, partisan groups, or use security services (e.g., formal military support) (Black 2003;Clarinval and Biller-Andorno 2014;Egeland et al 2011;Gastineau Campos and Farmer 2003;Haver 2016;Mačák 2014;Slim 1995;Sunga et al 2006;Weiss 2016). Additionally, working with local populations could be seen as a tacit endorsement of an ideology or political view (Joshi et al 2008).…”