1965
DOI: 10.2307/2023748
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Ethics and the Logic of Decision

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Cited by 132 publications
(127 citation statements)
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“…In these cases, whenever there are no possible models that satisfy a statement or a theory, instead of assigning to it the maximum quantity of information, three strategies have been suggested: 1) assigning to all inconsistent cases the same, infinite information value (Lozinskii [1994]). This is in line with an economic approach, which defines x as impossible if and only if that x has an infinite price; 4 2) eliminating all inconsistent cases a priori from consideration, as impossible outcomes in decision-making (Jeffrey [1990]). This is in line with the syntactic approach developed by the statistical theory of signals transmission 5 (STST, more on this in a moment);…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 54%
“…In these cases, whenever there are no possible models that satisfy a statement or a theory, instead of assigning to it the maximum quantity of information, three strategies have been suggested: 1) assigning to all inconsistent cases the same, infinite information value (Lozinskii [1994]). This is in line with an economic approach, which defines x as impossible if and only if that x has an infinite price; 4 2) eliminating all inconsistent cases a priori from consideration, as impossible outcomes in decision-making (Jeffrey [1990]). This is in line with the syntactic approach developed by the statistical theory of signals transmission 5 (STST, more on this in a moment);…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 54%
“…The standard Bayesian method for taking into account a probability shift that is not a shift to zero or one is Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey 1983). 8…”
Section: Confirming and Disconfirming Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…These constraints rule out the possibility of assigning each hypothesis an equal probability, because the sum of an infinite number of finite quantities, however small, will be infinite and hence not equal to 1 (the problems associated with such "improper" priors have been extensively discussed in the philosophy of science and the foundations of statistics; e.g., Carnap, 1952;Jeffrey, 1983;and Keynes, 1921 ). Therefore, an uneven distribution of prior probabilities is required.…”
Section: Likelihood and Prior Probabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%