A n important idea has overtaken recent discussions of planning ethics. 1 This idea holds that ethical questions depend heavily on context-that ethical concerns cannot be separated out easily from the details of particular situations, treated abstractly in the manner of analytical philosophy, but instead must be considered in situ. On this view, we cannot say what it means to be ethical by remaining in the precise but rarefied world of moral principles; we also need to grapple in some substantial way with the complex and messy details of actual cases. As John Forester (1999) put it, "When we have practical bets to make about what to do and what might work, theory matters-but so do the particulars of the situation we are in"; thus, to study morality in planning, "we need to explore not only how planners respond to standing norms and principles, but also how they attend to situational details" (pp. 21, 225).This perspective can be understood in terms made popular by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. Much discussion of ethical issues in planning has moved away from an "axiomatic" approach to normative judgment-one that aims to deduce conclusions about what to do from well-founded abstract principles (the "norms and principles" Forester refers to above)-and toward a casuistical, or case-oriented, approach to morality (one that "attends to situational details"). In Jonsen and Toulmin's (1988) words,We inherit two distinct ways of discussing ethical issues. One of these frames these issues in terms of principles, rules, and other general ideas; the other focuses on the specific features of particular kinds of moral cases. In the first way general ethical rules relate to specific moral cases in a theoretical manner, with universal rules serving as "axioms" from which particular moral judgments are deduced as theorems. In the second, this relation is frankly practical, with general moral rules serving as "maxims," which can be fully understood only in terms of the paradigmatic cases that define their meaning and force. (p. 23)In planning theory, the clearest examples of the axiomatic approach appear in efforts to clarify the general moral principles that do or should guide planning practice (e.g., the cases play a subordinate role in the sense that Jonsen and Toulmin suggest: the analyst derives judgments about what should be done in a particular case or evaluates actions that were actually taken by using deductive logic to deter-
AbstractCase studies have recently played a prominent role in the study of ethical issues in planning. To clarify the role that cases can play, this article investigates how two other professional fields (law and medical ethics) have used cases to analyze practical ethics. The author argues that law and medicine use studies to develop "moral taxonomies"-classifications of important cases that help clarify the meaning and limits of ambiguous values, principles, and maxims. Three features characterize case ethics in law and medicine: (1) a focus on hard cases, in which key values or principles a...