Ethnic Favoritism in Education in Kenya

Kramon, Eric; Posner, Daniel N.

doi:10.1561/100.00015005

Cited by 180 publications

(160 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…On the other hand, the objective of the Guardians of party r is to maximize the average payoff of the constituents of their party. 12 Since voting is probabilistic, the notion of constituency is statistical: the size of party r's constituency among caste j voters at the policy pair (x A , x B ) is ϕ r j (x A , x B ). Thus, the payoffs that the Guardians of each of the two parties, A and B, receive if their party r unilaterally deviates to the policỹ x r from the policy pair (x r , x −r ) are, respectively, given by…”

Section: A Simple Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caste, corruption and political competition in India

Acharya

Roemer

Somanathan

2015

Research in Economics

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Voters in India are often perceived as being biased in favor of parties that claim to represent their caste. We incorporate this caste bias into voter preferences and examine its influence on the distributive policies and corruption practices of the two major political parties in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.). We begin with a simple two-party, two-caste model to show that caste bias causes political parties to diverge in their policy platforms and has ambiguous effects on corruption. We then develop the model to make it correspond more closely to political reality by incorporating class-based redistributive policies. We use survey data from U.P. that we collected in [2008][2009] to calibrate voter preferences and other model parameters. We then numerically solve for the model's equilibria, and conduct a counterfactual analysis to estimate policies in the absence of caste bias. Our model predicts that the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which was in power at the time of our survey, would be significantly less corrupt in a world without caste-based preferences. * We are grateful to numerous people and seminar audiences for their comments and suggestions on this project, especially Nirvikar Singh and E. Sridharan. We thank Bhartendu Trivedi and his team at Morsel for their outstanding support in helping us design the survey questionnaire and in implementing it across U.P. The Institute for Social and Policy Studies and the Macmillan Center for International and Area Studies, both at Yale University, provided generous financial support. Bhanu Shri and Hyesung Kim provided outstanding research assistance.

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Section: A Simple Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caste, corruption and political competition in India

Acharya

Roemer

Somanathan

2015

Research in Economics

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“…Recent studies have exploited changes in the presidency to quantify the extent of ethnic favoritism in Kenya. Thereby, Kramon and Posner (2012) focus on educational attainments across individuals from different ethnic groups, and Burgess et al (2014) on road building across districts with different ethnic compositions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnic favoritism: An axiom of politics?

Luca

Hodler²,

Raschky

et al. 2018

Journal of Development Economics

153

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate the prevalence and determinants of ethnic favoritism, i.e., preferential public policies targeted at the political leader's ethnic group. We construct a panel dataset of 2,022 ethnographic regions from 139 countries with annual observations from 1992 to 2012, and use nighttime light intensity as output measure to capture the distributive effects of a wide range of policies. We find robust evidence for ethnic favoritism: the political leaders' ethnographic regions enjoy 10% higher nighttime light intensity. We further find that ethnic favoritism is a global rather than Sub-Saharan African phenomenon, which is present in poor as well as rich countries; that political institutions have a weak effect on ethnic favoritism; that ethnic favoritism is most prevalent in ethnically fractionalized and segregated countries with long established polities; and that ethnic favoritism does not contribute to sustainable development. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D720, R110, J150, O430.

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“…Relative to developed countries, per pupil spending in developing countries is heavily skewed toward tertiary education, which only a select few can access, rather than primary education (as shown in the World Bank EdStats database). In addition, a number of authors have documented examples of elite capture of education resources such as new school construction in Kenya (Kramon and Posner 2016), and school finances in Uganda (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Need for Accountability in Education in Developing Countries

Mbiti

2016

Journal of Economic Perspectives

101

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Despite the rapid growth in enrollment rates across the developing world, there are major concerns about the quality of education that children receive. Across numerous developing countries, recent learning assessments have revealed that children are not able to develop basic numeracy and literary skills. These low levels of learning are the result of a number of interrelated factors, many of which reflect the low levels of accountability across multiple levels of the education system. In this paper, I document the main education challenges facing developing countries, including the lack of accountability among teachers and school management. I also review recent literature that documents the effectiveness of interventions aimed at addressing these accountability issues. Finally, I assess the potential for the market to improve accountability in the education sector in developing countries.

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Ethnic Favoritism in Education in Kenya

Cited by 180 publications

References 43 publications

Caste, corruption and political competition in India

Caste, corruption and political competition in India

Ethnic favoritism: An axiom of politics?

The Need for Accountability in Education in Developing Countries

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