Ethnic outbidding and nested competition: Explaining the extremism of ethnonational minority parties in Europe

Abstract

The classical outbidding model of ethnic politics argues that democratic competition involving ethnic parties inevitably leads to ethnic outbidding where parties adopt ever more extreme positions. However, recent small‐N studies show that ethnic outbidding is only one of a range of strategies available to ethnic parties. This article seeks to explain why some ethnic parties are extremist, whereas others adopt moderate positions. Drawing on the ethnic outbidding and the nested competition model of ethnic party competition, it is hypothesised that the ethnic segmentation of the electoral market, and the relative salience of an ethnically cross‐cutting economic dimension of party competition, account for the varying degrees of extremism. Hypotheses are tested drawing on a novel, expert‐survey‐based dataset that provides indicators for the positions of 83 ethnonational minority parties in 22 European democracies in 2011. Results of ordinary least squares and two‐level linear regressions show that as the economic dimension gains importance, parties become more moderate relative to the party system mean. The electorate's ethnic segmentation has a positive effect on extremism, but this effect is not significant in all models. Contrary to expectations, higher ethnic segmentation of the party system is associated with more moderate positions in the majority of the estimated models.

Turning discontent into votes: Economic inequality and ethnic outbidding

“…In fact, this research indicates that inequality is a much better predictor of ethnic political mobilization than either individual (Stewart and McGauvran 2019) or group-based resources (Cederman et al, 2011). Researchers have consistently found that the economic dimensions of competition gains importance relative to the ethnonational dimensions (for instance, see Zuber 2013), and that increases in economic inequality can make the ethnic dimension more salient (Esteban and Ray 2008), leading to greater electoral market segmentation (Vogt 2017), and greater motivation to support candidates that take more extreme positions (Zuber and Szöcsik 2015).…”

The Spanish Plurinational Labyrinth. Practical Reasons for Criticising the Nationalist Bias of Others While Ignoring One’s Own Nationalist Position

“…In the case of right-wing regional nationalist parties, insofar as they have been hegemonic in their respective communities (this is especially clear in the case of the PNV in the Basque Country and CIU in Catalonia), their strategy has in general been aimed at seeking any type of agreement to maintain that dominant position. In the case of the PNV, due to the ostracism of left-wing regional nationalism because of its link to violence, its strategy has consisted of guaranteeing its prevalent position (Zuber and Szocsik 2015) through a plurinational agreement with a left-wing state-wide party, enabling it to consolidate its hegemonic position with reasonable ease (Moreno 2000). In the case of CIU, the existence of a real alternative of a left-wing plurinational government in Catalonia, as occurred between 2004 and 2010, obliged it to reconsider its strategy: To seek a non-plurinational Catalan government or to seek a plurinational government with the PP.…”

From adversaries to allies: ethnic gerrymandering and ethnic party behaviour in local elections in Macedonia

“…In this regard, ethnic parties are less likely to engage in outbidding when they compete on multidimensional cleavages (such as the caste cleavage in India) rather than on a unidimensional cleavage (such as the religious cleavage between Hindus and Muslims) (Chandra ). Other research indicates that ethnic parties are likely to moderate their positions when economic policy is a more pressing concern than ethnic issues (Zuber and Szöcsik ) and that power‐sharing institutions influence the viability of outbidding as a political strategy (Coakley ; Garry ; Mitchell, Evans and O'Leary ). Moreover, ethnic parties are less likely to engage in outbidding when they begin to see themselves as competing with both mainstream and ethnic parties (Zuber , ).…”