Ethno‐religious Fundamentalism and Theo‐ethnocratic Politics in Israel

Abstract

This article addresses the transition of a fundamentalist confrontational religious ideology into an assertive, religio-nationalist ideology by the case of the ethnoUltra-Orthodox (haredi) Shas party in Israel. Alongside the haredi proclivity towards insularity, we also detect, in recent decades, two new trends within the haredi mainstream. First, we see increasing numbers of haredim (Ultra-Orthodox Jews) integrating into different frameworks that are situated outside of the haredi enclave: the job market, the army, welfare and charity organizations, and more. A second trend, which I will elaborate upon here, is a fundamentalist religious interpretation of elements of Israeli national identity. This trend seeks to view Jewish law, in its orthodox interpretation, as a source for the conservation and maintenance of Jewish identity in Israel: firstly, through the turning of haredism into a dominant factor in the religio-communal arena in Israel; and secondly, through assuming responsibility for demarcating the boundaries of the Jewish collective.This article addresses the transition of a fundamentalist, confrontational religious ideology into an assertive, religio-nationalist one. Setting aside for the moment the political connotations of the word 'fundamentalism' as a label that plays a role in the struggle between fervently religious forces and secular forces in modern society (Ruthven 2004), we might describe fundamentalism as a family of modern religious ideologies which have a restorative goal (Zeidan 2003). These ideologies have as their aim to restore the conservative religious order -at least as they perceive it. So long as this has not yet been achieved, the fundamentalists take care to separate themselves from general society, creating a sort of counter-society (Sivan 1995). Naturally, this produces a permanent tension between fundamentalists and the frameworks of the modern nation-state.

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