This article analyses Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations in order to assess how the move towards tighter economic integration within the EU-US strategic partnership impacts legislativeexecutive relations in EU trade policy. The analysis examines the institutional, substantive and party political dimensions of national parliaments' scrutiny of the Common Commercial Policy. Based on insights into both domestic and EU channels of parliamentary monitoring of TTIP negotiations, the article argues that, although the government remains the central object of democratic control, NPs' involvement in transatlantic trade extends beyond the government's foreign policy to encompass the EU's own transatlantic and trade policies. This is rooted in the legislatures' legal capacity to constrain the executive in the negotiation, conclusion and, where applicable, ratification phases of EU trade agreements. It is submitted that national parliamentary influence takes the shape of politicisation of the legitimacy of the expected policy outcomes of these agreements.
KeywordsTTIP, national parliaments, transatlantic relations, EU trade policy, mixed agreements 1. Introduction: The Transforming Nature of Transatlantic Affairs With increasing economic and regulatory interdependence between the US and the EU (Jančić 2015; Buonanno 2015; Vogel and Swinnen 2011; Pollack and Shaffer 2001), transatlantic relations began transforming from being solely a matter of bilateral foreign policy of each Member State to being also an EU-wide policy. This metamorphosis was acknowledged in the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), both of which invoke the importance of parliamentary cooperation. Yet since this refers primarily to the US Congress and the European Parliament (EP), it is unclear to what extent national parliaments of the EU Member States (NPs) are a part of transatlantic trade politics.First, while both Congress and the EP have a say in EU-US international agreements by means of consent (Servent 2014), NPs only have this right if these agreements are concluded as mixed. Second, in June 2015 Congress granted the US President the so-called Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), or 'fast-track procedure', which enables the US executive to conclude international agreements with limited involvement of Congress if certain 'overall' and 'principal' trade negotiating objectives are upheld (Fergusson 2015). 1 Although the TPA is not legally required for the US executive to conduct external trade policy, once it is enacted it becomes a binding guarantee of ex ante congressional influence. Neither the EP nor NPs have such a strong tool at their disposal before the onset of trade negotiations. Third, the EP and Congress have since 1999 met on a biannual basis within the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), which has been developing 'ever-broader agendas' to mirror EU-US intergovernmental meetings (Burghardt 2015: 219). No such transatlantic interparliamentary forum exists for NPs, whic...