EULEX and the fight against organised crime in Kosovo: what’s the record?

Understanding the challenges to investigating and prosecuting organ trafficking: a comparative analysis of two cases

“…Kosovo's anti-THB legislation and the experience of its investigators and prosecutors were however made obsolete by the country's volatile post-conflict environment, its contested sovereignty, and its high prevalence of corruption and organised crime. Notably, the reported challenges in the Medicus case are not specific to organ trafficking cases only but are known to hamper investigation and prosecution of a wide range of serious offences in Kosovo (Friesendorf 2010;Proksik 2017Proksik , 2018. Nonetheless, this study illustrates the importance of incorporating a weak legal environment, a lack of institutional readiness, corruption, weak statehood and geo-political fragility within the broader criminal justice literature as impediments to prosecution of organ trafficking crimes.…”

“…As a result, illicit economies proliferated to fill the gaps in Kosovo's economy (Proksik 2013(Proksik , 2017. Organized crime in post-war Kosovo was rife, with trafficking of women for sexual exploitation being the most lucrative illicit activity fueled by the arrival of international peace-keepers (De Wildt 2015;Proksik 2017Proksik , 2018. According to The Washington Post, Kosovo was the European capital for THB during that time (Stefanova 2004).…”

“…Many of these networks obtained political influence, with many of its former leaders acquiring governmental positions. Many continue to hold government positions in Kosovo today (Proksik 2017(Proksik , 2018. A number of these 'political elites' have been repeatedly accused of either being directly involved in organized crime (including trafficking crimes) or maintaining close relationships with criminal networks (Proksik 2013(Proksik , 2017.…”

The political regime as a determinant of inward foreign direct investment

“…Hence, EULEX efforts for capacity -building did not bear fruit, especially in the high-risk area of fighting organised crime and controlling corruption. However, the mission continues to support rule-of-law institutions in Kosovo for enforcing their ability to provide effectiveness, sustainability, multiethnicity, and accountability, excluding any political interference and complying completely with EU best practices (Morelli, 2018;Proksik, 2018). Since there are NATO [217] member states which do not recognise Kosovo's independence, KFOR also evolved as a status-neutral body in Kosovo.…”

“…These high records have acted as a stimulus to emigration and informal economic activities (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 18). The human trafficking for sexual reasons became one of the primary source of income in Kosovo after arms and drugs for the Kosovar-Albanian mafia network (Proksik, 2018, p. 404). During 2014 Kosovars left the country seeking a better future within the EU (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 18) The formal labour market is yet not fully developed while the informal labour activity is flourishing (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b).…”