Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?

Rumer, Eugene B.

doi:10.2307/1149221

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This hope constitutes the core of the 'common will for a common political life'. As long as this common yearning for peace and stability remains, Ukraine will not disintegrate (for different views, see Economist 1994; Larrabee 1994;Rumer 1994).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Liber

1998

Nations and Nationalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, it did not possess an integrated Ukrainian state identity. Serious differences between those regions which entered the Russian empire and the Soviet Union before 1939 and those annexed since 1939 hampered the creation of a post‐Soviet state identity. Just as the Ukrainian and Russian languages dominate in different regions in Ukraine, attitudes towards economic reform also vary by region. Russian‐speaking areas are more conservative in regard to economic reforms than Ukrainian‐speaking ones. But despite these regional differences, Ukraine is not on the verge of civil war. Two public opinion polls taken in 1991 and 1994 in Lviv (in Western Ukraine) and in Donetsk (in Eastern Ukraine) document that the citizens of Ukraine possess a common desire for peace and stability. This desire overshadows Ukraine's regional differences and will help create the new post‐Soviet Ukrainian state identity.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Liber

1998

Nations and Nationalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…With the peninsula's structural predisposition towards regional conflict, some commentators even argued that Russian annexation would be preferable to the expected continuing instability. 28 Thus, given the military necessity and cultural longing for Sevastopol, com- START II had also just been signed, in early 1993 -but it would not enter into force until START I was fully implemented. US policymakers were impatient for this happen, because of the treaty's value in banning destabilising multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and heavy ICBMs.…”

Section: Orlando Figes Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fantasy Counterfactual: A Nuclear-Armed Ukraine

Rublee¹

2015

Survival

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…During the early years of Ukraine's independence, one of the biggest concerns of Western observers was that Ukraine might be challenged in maintaining its sovereignty, especially as Russian policy makers wanted to create a union between Russia and Ukraine (Balmaceda, 1998;Burant, 1995;Mroz and Pavliuk, 1996;Trenin, 2007). Some scholars questioned whether Russia would just force Ukraine to join Russia (Bremmer, 1994;Rumer, 1994). The deep mistrust that characterized Russian-Ukrainian relations continued -and became even more public -through the 1990s.…”

Section: Russia and Ukrainementioning

confidence: 99%

Mistrust and hegemony: Regional institutional design, the FSU-CIS, and Russia

Willerton

Goertz

Slobodchikoff

2015

International Area Studies Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many relationships between states over the centuries. One approach that states can take to deal with these two, often interrelated, problems is to create intergovernmental institutions and arrangements designed to accommodate the interests of states with varied power capabilities. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) embodies an interesting institutional design in an effort by former Soviet Union (FSU) countries to address these dilemmas. The CIS was not only the first multilateral FSU organization created following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it also provided a necessary and important framework for the further construction of bilateral and multilateral relations among the former Soviet republics as they reengaged one another. CIS arrangements have been augmented by extensive bilateral negotiations and treaties and, brought together, these interconnected multilateral and bilateral instruments yield a system of cautious regional security governance and framework for international relations within the FSU. This paper analyzes three key features of this foundational CIS institutional design: (1) legalism, (2) an à la carte choice of treaty instruments, and (3) nested bilateralism, wherein many details of the regional, multilateral agreements are implemented via bilateral treaties (hence constituting a combination design feature). Empirically, the paper illuminates this institutional design using a unique dataset of all multilateral security treaties of the CIS (approximately 185) and all bilateral security treaties (more than 500) between the regional hegemon, Russia, and the smaller CIS members. We further investigate the causal mechanisms of the CIS institutional design as it copes with the conditions of hegemony and

show abstract

Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994

Fantasy Counterfactual: A Nuclear-Armed Ukraine

Mistrust and hegemony: Regional institutional design, the FSU-CIS, and Russia

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About