Europe as a global regulator? The limits of EU influence in international food safety standards

The European Union as a global regulator? Context and comparison

“…Stringent rules, however, increase the likelihood that the EU will a preference outlier and thus reduce the likelihood that agreed international standards will reflect its own (Young 2014). Thus, ceteris paribus, the EU's regulatory power resources are less significant with respect to rule-mediated standard setting than they are in power-based bargaining when exclusion is possible, but somewhat more so than in power-based bargaining when it is not.…”

Putting the EU in its place: policy strategies and the global regulatory context

“…Second, we join other critics who have had no difficulty poking holes in both civilian and normative power explanations by identifying non-conforming cases (Bretherton and Vogler 2013;Pollack and Shaffer 2009;Young 2014Young , 2015b. The larger point, in our view, is that the EU-as-a-global-power explanations tend to take reductionist and monocausal approaches.…”

“…On the one hand, research has trumpeted the EU's influence, emphasizing, alternatively, the ideas and values that animate EU efforts or power resources rooted in the size and institutional configurations of its internal market (Bradford 2012;Damro 2012;Falkner 2007;Manners 2006). On the other hand, a significant literature details the limits of EU efforts, pointing to its failure to shape global rules in high-profile issue areas (Bretherton and Vogler 2013;Leblond 2011;Sbragia 2010;Young 2014). The skeptics argue that even in cases where the EU has clear preferences (consistent with its reputation as a soft and normative power) and bargaining leverage because of well-developed markets and capacities, such as in the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) dispute, it has not always been able to assert its interests globally or even to adopt strategies towards that end (Pollack and Shaffer 2009).…”

“…Moreover, these approaches frequently equate power resources with influence over outcomes, largely ignoring the political processes that filter and shape the effectiveness of such resources. The result is a frequent overestimation of EU influence and an inability to make sense of important empirical observations such as variance in EU authority across time and sector, cases in which the EU initially had little influence but later found its voice (Posner 2009), or the failure of influence despite a large market and distinct norms, such as in the case of GMOs or food safety (Pollack and Shaffer 2009;Young 2014). In fact, there has been a growing body of research highlighting the varying nature of EU influence across regulatory domains.…”

“…In those cases, however, where the EU can forge a bloc of like-minded partners, either through linkage strategies or deliberative approaches, it will be able to use the organization to promote its rules. Alasdair Young (2014), for example, demonstrates this argument in food and safety standards developed through the Codex Alimentarius, where EU preference extremes stymie its efforts to change global standards. And in those cases where the EU builds a change coalition, the outcome is not always identical with EU internal rules.…”