Europe’s Bank and Europe’s Citizens: Accountability, transparency – legitimacy?

Koop, Christel; Reh, Christine

doi:10.1177/1023263x19827906

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Others are more sceptical of such a project. Even if it could be made to work, what evidence is there to show that the values and principles of liberal democracy can confer legitimacy on non-majoritarian institutions like central banks (Koop and Reh 2019)? We live in a world where the idea of representative democracy is in crisis, in part perhaps because our elected representatives themselves disavow responsibility for policy outcomes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter-Organisational Distrust and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in the UK

Buller

Whisker

2020

New Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The reference "Fay (1986)" is cited in the text but is not listed in the references list. Please either delete the in-text citation or provide full reference details following journal style.Response: Resolved Q5 : The reference "Lamont 1992" is cited in the text but is not listed in the references list. Please either delete the in-text citation or provide full reference details following journal style. Response: Resolved Q6 : The CrossRef database (www.crossref.org/) has been used to validate the references. Mismatches between the original manuscript and CrossRef are tracked in red font. Please provide a revision if the change is incorrect. Do not comment on correct changes Response: Resolved Q7 : The reference "Burnham 2007" is listed in the references list but is not cited in the text. Please either cite the reference or remove it from the references list. Response: Resolved Q8 : Please provide missing page range for reference "Goodhart 2014" references list entry. Response: Resolved Q9 : The reference "Granovetter 1985" is listed in the references list but is not cited in the text. Please either cite the reference or remove it from the references list. Response: Resolved Q10 : Please provide missing page range for reference "Hall 1989" references list entry. Response: Resolved Q11 : Please provide missing page range for reference "Hallerberg 2003" references list entry. Response: Resolved Q12 : Please provide missing page range for reference "Kynaston 1995" references list entry. Response: Resolved Q13 : Please provide missing page range for reference "Thompson 2014" references list entry. Response: Resolved CM1 : The phrase (Governor of the Bank of England 1966-73) is not a reference. We are indicating the period of time that leslie O'Brien was Governor of the Bank of England. CM2 : I have tried to add the Wass reference but when I click on the reference button on the top bar I get the message: 'Adding references in Front Matter is not allowed..,'. The Wass reference is Wass, D. 2008. Decline to fall: the making of British macro-economic policy and the 1976 IMF crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CM3 : This should not be a standalone sentence. Please attach this sentence to the start of the paragraph directly below beginning: 'First, CBI was perceived ... CM4 : Jim Buller is a senior lecturer in Politics at the University of York. He has written widely on the subject of British public policy. His latest book, Comparing Strategies of Depoliticisation in Europe: Governance, Resistance and Anti-politics (with Pinar Emine Donmez, Adam Standring and Matt Wood) was published by Palgrave in 2018. Ben Whisker is an ESRC funded PhD student in the Politics Department, at the University of York. His thesis presents a reappraisal of ideational accounts of the Thatcher Governments utilising recently released archival material.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter-Organisational Distrust and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in the UK

Buller

Whisker

2020

New Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the meantime, public trust in the ECB -almost always marginally lower than trust in the Commission and significantly lower than trust in the European Parliament -declined from a high of 53% in the Spring of 2007 to a low of 31% in the Spring of 2014. 41 The trust:distrust ratio for the ECB was consistently negative, reaching a high of 10 percentage points in the spring of 2015 -when the trust:distrust ratio for the Commission was no longer negative. In Germany, trust in the ECB (in the spring of 2015) reached 32% while distrust reached 54% for a record differential of 22 percentage points -the highest of any euro area Member State with the notable exceptions of Greece, Spain and Cyprus.…”

Section: The Political Salience Of Ecb Policies and Their Perceivmentioning

confidence: 96%

The democratic deficit and European Central Bank crisis monetary policies

Högenauer

Howarth

2019

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument-defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik-that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB's monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions.

show abstract

“…In particular, it hinges on a distinction between different types of accountability, which we might refer to as formal versus substantive accountability (Jourdan & Diessner 2019: 6-7). Formal accountability merely entails an ex post answerability by the central bank for its policy actions, whereas substantive accountability also entails the ability to threaten or issue the central bank with sanctions and rewards (Sibert 2010;Koop & Reh 2019).…”

Section: The Political Problem Of Ecb Communication With the European...mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

Diessner

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay traces the evolution of the communication between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) over the past 25 years of Monetary Dialogues between the two supranational institutions. The essay begins with a reflection on the political problem of central bank communication. It then sketches out three distinct phases of ECB-EP relations over time. The main contention is that ECB communication with the EP has started, and should continue, to move from a one-way street to a multi-way street, in the interest of further improving the democratic credentials of EMU.

show abstract

Europe’s Bank and Europe’s Citizens: Accountability, transparency – legitimacy?

Cited by 9 publications

References 22 publications

Inter-Organisational Distrust and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in the UK

Inter-Organisational Distrust and the Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in the UK

The democratic deficit and European Central Bank crisis monetary policies

On the Monetary Dialogue between the European Central Bank and the European Parliament: From monetary monologue to dialogue—and beyond?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About