European fiscal reform preferences of parliamentarians in France, Germany and Italy

Abstract

Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationist. Furthermore, the relative position of French and Italian policymakers is issue dependent and the left dimension outweighs the German dimension in two out of seven reform issues. Finally, populism intensifies the polarizing impact of national interests.

Collective memories on the 2010 European debt crisis

“…(2018) shows, that leading newspapers in Germany, France, Italy and Spain blamed (or did not blame) individual countries for the 2010 European debt crisis. The narrative of national politicians is also very likely to influence collective memories: when national politicians blame individual countries for the crisis or downplay public debt, citizens are likely to adopt those views (Blesse et al., 2020b). Future research may therefore examine in more detail why collective memories on the 2010 European debt crisis differ.…”