European integration and supranational governance

Sweet, Alec Stone; Sandholtz, Wayne

doi:10.1080/13501769780000011

Cited by 422 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…European integration combines several of these threats and poses one more: It undermines national sov- ereignty. As scholars of European integration have long argued, one of the chief consequences of European integration is weakening the authority of national states (Börzel & Risse, 2000;Caporaso, 1996Caporaso, , 2000Hooghe & Marks, 2001;Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 1995;Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996;Risse-Kappen, 1996;Schmitter, 1996;Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997). This is a core idea of multi-level governance, and it is anathema to those on the radical Right, which is why parties toward the TAN pole strenuously oppose European integration.…”

Section: The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?

Hooghe

Marks

Wilson³

2002

Comparative Political Studies

1,187

729

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How is contestation on European integration structured among national political parties? Are issues arising from European integration assimilated into existing dimensions of domestic contestation? We show that there is a strong relationship between the conventional left/right dimension and party positioning on European integration. However, the most powerful source of variation in party support is the new politics dimension, ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian to Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist.

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Section: The Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?

Hooghe

Marks

Wilson³

2002

Comparative Political Studies

1,187

729

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Despite the relative decreasing power gap between itself and the weaker state, the stronger state will also prefer to sustain the existing level of integration and even attempt to augment gains by agreeing to increase the level of economic liberalization and institutionalization. This is in part because, once these institutions and interests of related societal actors in the stronger state are entrenched, it will become more difficult to return to lower levels of institutionalization (Stone, Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). More importantly, though, stronger states will want to continue integration because the preferences of member states will likely be inclined toward absolute gains due to the extended time horizon and scope of cooperation and thus they will fear less the possibility of defection from member states.…”

Section: Economic Power Gap Differences and Formal Economic Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Engaging with More Institutions?: Changes in Economic Power Distribution and Levels of Economic Cooperation

Yoo¹

2015

kjis

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for their comments on earlier versions of this article and is also grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.What is the effect of changing economic power on the level of institutional cooperation? The existing literature provides contradictory theories. Some posit that power preponderance, such as the presence of hegemony, is the key to greater cooperation, whereas others such as neofunctionalists contend that power parity is a more favorable condition for deeper integration. Unlike these monotonous and static proposals, this article argues for the presence of a curvilinear and dynamic relationship between changes in power ratios and levels of formal economic integration, showing extensive cooperation at large and small power gap differences but less cooperation at the status quo. In addition, states' concern for the distributive consequences of formal economic integration is considered a key condition in the development of the integration. This power gap difference hypothesis is tested with my original data set of four-tier preferential trade agreements (PTAs) from 1950 to 2005. The analysis employs models for ordered outcomes. The research findings largely support the power gap difference hypothesis and add to our knowledge that the dynamic shift of economic power and distribution gives incentives to states to develop certain levels of formal integration.

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“…Liberals, conversely, argue that shifting states' authority to supranational regional institutions is possible, often desirable and observable (Hammerlund 2005). Functionalists and neofunctionalists contend that increasing interdependence tends to promote greater integration and the pooling of national sovereignty within regional institutions (see Haas 1960;Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997;Mattli 1999), while liberal intergovernmentalists explain states' cession of sovereignty to regional institutions in terms of self-interest (Moravcsik 1998). …”

Section: Regulatory Regionalism In Asiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory regionalism and anti-money-laundering governance in Asia

Hameiri

Jones

2014

Australian Journal of International Affairs

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With the intensification of the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) worldwide campaign to promote anti-money laundering regulation since the late 1990s, all Asian states except North Korea have signed up to its rules and have established a regional institution -the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering -to promote and oversee the implementation of FATF's 40Recommendations in the region. This paper analyses the FATF regime, making two key claims: first, anti-money laundering governance in Asia reflects a broader shift to regulatory regionalism, particularly in economic matters, in that its implementation and functioning depend upon the rescaling of ostensibly domestic agencies to function within a regional governance regime. Second, although this form of regulatory regionalism is established in order to bypass the perceived constraints of national sovereignty and political will, it nevertheless inevitably becomes entangled within the socio-political conflicts that shape the exercise of state power more broadly. Consequently, understanding the outcomes of regulatory regionalism involves identifying how these conflicts shape how far and in what manner global regulations are adopted and implemented within specific territories. This argument is demonstrated by a case study of Myanmar.

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European integration and supranational governance

Cited by 422 publications

References 26 publications

Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?

Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?

Why Engaging with More Institutions?: Changes in Economic Power Distribution and Levels of Economic Cooperation

Regulatory regionalism and anti-money-laundering governance in Asia

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