European Parliament Ascendant

(Un)settling the precedent: Contrasting institutionalisation dynamics in the spitzenkandidaten procedure of 2014 and 2019

“…The key actors in both cases are the EP and the Council and their respective constituent units and individuals. Notably, the EP has constantly sought to increase its relevance in the EU’s political system through the creation of informal rules, including on the investiture of the Commission (Héritier et al, 2019: 61–79). These have, over time, altered the investiture as the EP deployed strategies such as acting as a first mover on matters like the spitzenkandidaten (Héritier et al, 2019: 14–15).…”

“…Notably, the EP has constantly sought to increase its relevance in the EU’s political system through the creation of informal rules, including on the investiture of the Commission (Héritier et al, 2019: 61–79). These have, over time, altered the investiture as the EP deployed strategies such as acting as a first mover on matters like the spitzenkandidaten (Héritier et al, 2019: 14–15). The collective EP preference on changes to the appointment procedure was first vocalised in a 2012 EP resolution (European Parliament, 2012) that confronted the strict ‘letter’ of the treaty, that is the Council’s legal prerogative, with its reading of the treaty ‘spirit’, that is that the EP elections would bind the Council’s hand.…”

The European Parliament and the eurozone crisis: An exceptional actor?

“…Former vice president of the ECON Committee). As a means to broaden its influence across the six-pack legislative package, the European Parliament employed a strategy of issue linkage: ‘Even if one was not decided under co-decision, it was dealt with as though being under co-decision’ (Héritier et al, 2015: 66). The seventh European Parliament, elected in 2009, had a strong centre-right contingent: the European People’s Party (EPP) with 36% of seats, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) with 25%, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) with 11%, and the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) with 8% (O’Keeffe et al, 2016: 221).…”

“…In addition to being ideologically divided on fiscal integration, MEPs were also faced with substantial pressure from the EU institutions to enact the six-pack legislation (Bressanelli and Chelotti, 2016; Héritier et al, 2015). First, the Task Force, under the leadership of President Van Rompuy, had encouraged a ‘fast-tracked’ approach (European Council, 2010a).…”

“…The political form of the two-pack as a Community method legislative procedure was therefore supported by the European Parliament (Senior MEP (ALDE) in the ECON Committee, 2013, Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 24 September). Senior member of the ECON Committee and chief negotiator; see also Héritier et al, 2015: 69). However, when the economic proposals were presented to the ECON committee at the end February 2012, ideological divisions had intensified with a rift forming between centre-right proponents of the ordoliberal two-pack and a strengthened centre-left coalition advocating Keynesian counter-frames (European Parliament, 2012c).…”