Euroscepticism as a political label: The use of European Union issues in political competition in the new Member States

Abstract

Abstract. During the 1990s, political consensus on European Union (EU) membership in Central Europe gave way to widespread ambiguous positions – many parties approved the principle of European integration while criticizing EU policies. In the late 1990s, two analytical frameworks – cleavage theories and typologies of Euroscepticism – were developed to account for this change in political debate. Cleavage theories tend to downplay the evolution of party positions during the 1990s, whereas typologies of Euroscepticism create analytical categories that are difficult to operationalize. Both perspectives have a limited understanding of the relationship between ideology and strategy with regard to party positions on European integration. This article follows a broader research design focusing on the use of European issues in political competition in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic after the fall of communism. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, ideology and strategy are closely related because ideologies are created by politicians in order to differentiate themselves from their competitors and to gain political capital. Politics is essentially a competition to impose certain lines of division in the political field and to classify actors along those lines. In Central Europe after 1989, references to Europe allowed politicians to shape and reshape three lines of division, distinguishing mainstream from protest parties, mainstream political actors from their competitors and intra‐party currents from each other. Yet EU issues could be used only according to some general rules of political competition that evolved over time. As early as 1990, a pro‐European stance was a political norm acting as a normative theme– that is, a general rule that determined political actors' behaviours. As the pre‐accession process unfolded, a tension emerged between a necessary collusion between parties that moderated their criticisms in order to appear to be legitimate political actors, and instrumentalization of EU issues to gain political capital at the expense of competitors. In the late 1990s, saying ‘yes, but’ to accession to the EU became a pragmatic rule of the political game – that is, a set of rules of a lesser importance that actors could freely define without any risk of stigmatization. This shift resulted in ambiguous party positions on EU integration. Considering the word ‘Euroscepticism’ as a tool for political classification rather than as an analytical notion sheds a new light on the dynamics of party positions on European issues. These findings have wider relevance for the study of the Europeanization of national political systems in the enlarged EU because pre‐accession politics in Central Europe amplified logics that also exist in Western Europe. There is a difference in degree, but not in kind, between the uses of the European themes in political competitions in new and in old EU Member States.

The multi-faceted nature of party-based Euroscepticism

“…For example, they were more reluctant than parties in the old member states about the supranational mode of decision-making, more concerned about the defence of national identity, as well as about the supposed threat represented by the out-group of non-Europeans. In the end, although in the new member states the EU was framed by mainstream parties as an optimistic normative theme (Neumayer, 2008), the image of the party discourse which has emerged from the analysis of these countries is one of a more nationally introverted fashion, where preferences about future developments of the EU are not fully shaped yet, but they present inner elements of resistance to deeper integration. Party attitudes in these countries might be a reflection of their recent entry in the EU and their asymmetric experience with EU affairs compared to parties in the old member states.…”

“…Additionally, in Table 3 we show estimates for the variables of the EES 2009 that are comparable with those used for the analysis of . Finally, since research shows that attitudes in the new member states can be rather distinctive from those in the old member states (Neumayer, 2008), we also disaggregated our estimates by EU geographic areas, distinguishing between old and new member states. 7 As for the issue of membership, the results very clearly show that the centrality of a party's position along the political spectrum is indeed a strong predictor of its stance.…”

Drivers of Euroenthusiasm of National Political Elites: the Test of the EU Economic Crisis

“…The moderate versus extremist political views variable also taps into the field of political culture. The European menu is rich, and different parties choose different dishes from it in line with their own agendas and policy priorities (Sitter 2001;Neumayer 2008). Only the extreme (marginal) positions are simple, while the mainstream parties express a variety of moderate positions.…”

“…Again, since the European menu is rich, different parties can choose different combinations of options that correspond not only to their ideological preferences, but also conform to their short-term strategies on the domestic scene (Neumayer 2008;Dakowska 2010). Research shows that Euroskepticism is stronger among opposition parties (De Vries -Edwards 2009;Taggart 1998).…”

Understanding Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics

“…Often accepting the historical and cultural roots of Europe, the ER in CEE opposes the political dimension of the EU by claiming that EU membership creates a negative comparative disadvantage in terms of the national sovereignty of nation states, and a loss of recently regained independence (Pirro, 2014). Culturally, it rejects the diffusion of Western or liberal attitudes (Neumayer, 2008) and the liberal agenda of the European Union, such as the protection of ethnic and sexual minorities and the promotion of gender equality (Bustikova, 2009). As the focus of attention moved from 'accession' to 'integration' in CEE countries, anti-European frames have become more prevalent (Pirro and van Kessel, 2013), and the financial and refugee crises of recent years have led to the politicization of the issue, making the EU, as an enemy, more salient in the political discourse of extreme right-wing parties.…”