Eurozone Governance in 2016: The Italian Banking Crisis, Fiscal Flexibility and Brexit (Plus Plus Plus)

Hodson, Dermot

doi:10.1111/jcms.12602

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The literature on EMU development, German positions regarding fiscal transfers and the negotiations dynamics between France and Germany show consistencies over a longer period of time that underline Germany's deeply-seated domestic preferences for conservative monetary and fiscal policy (Hodson, 2017;Howarth & Verdun, 2020). This pattern remains consistent despite two concessions to French preferences for more interventionist and activist fiscal policy that can be attributed to the cognitive frameworks of individual German Chancellors.…”

Section: Framework and Case Designmentioning

confidence: 87%

German Politics and Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Eurozone Budget

Donnelly

2021

PaG

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This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.

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Section: Framework and Case Designmentioning

confidence: 87%

German Politics and Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Eurozone Budget

Donnelly

2021

PaG

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“…In this regard, we opine that even though certain problems have been resolved (a fact that helps explain why the dynamic total connectedness has recovered from the low levels of 2012) there are still sources of uncertainty that torment the EMU (justifying perhaps why the dynamic total connectedness has not fully returned to its initial levels; that is, before 2009). Relevant considerations that highlight current problems within the EMU and further relate to the broader question of whether Europe should integrate more or become more fragmented, have also been raised by authors such as Hodson (2017) and Verdun (2018).…”

Section: Financial Risk Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

EMU risk-synchronisation and financial fragility through the prism of dynamic connectedness

Chatziantoniou

Gabauer

2021

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

156

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This study employs dynamic connectedness as a measure of financial risk synchronization considering government bond yields in 11 EMU member states. In particular, large values of the relevant index can be an indication of comparable levels of risk further implying that the common currency area consists of a financially sensible set of countries. By contrast, small connectedness values can be an indication of fragmentation whereupon certain countries are considered to be safer than others. The latter would be detrimental for the EMU as it fuels financial fragility, which practically stipulates that crises occur as a result of self-fulfilling market fears. The results are based on a daily dataset which spans between 1st September 2003 and 31st August 2018. Findings show that fragmentation was present at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis and that the interconnectedness has not yet reverted to its pre-2009 levels. In addition, core countries appear to transmit shocks to periphery countries although, occasionally, there are noteworthy disparities. Further investigating these disparities on a pairwise connectedness level -which helps to identify sensible pairs of countries in terms of financial risk -shows that core countries dominate this exercise, with the exception of the bilateral relation between Italy and Spain. The fact that most periphery countries of our sample are not included in these pairs raises concerns and calls for a more substantial integration.

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“…In fact, the various proposals for clearer external representation in economic affairs, which dominate the sections on legitimacy and democracy in the reform documents of the Commission, for example in the White Paper published in the Summer, reflect a desire for greater competence for the Commission and other EU level actors. The issue of external representation is a recognized challenge (Hodson, ) however, it is not the only, or even the primary, legitimacy challenge faced by the EU in economic policy (Jones, ; Scharpf, ).…”

Section: The Politics Of Economic Governance In 2017mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In his, now annual, State of the Union address to the European Parliament, Commission President Jean‐Claude Juncker celebrated the recovery and growth, delighting in the fact that growth in the EU has outstripped that of the United States for the past two years (European Commission, ). These signals of success cannot hide many of the continuing weaknesses in the architecture of the European economy – the problems of divergent economic models remain, and there are still several banks and financial institutions that give reason for caution (Hodson, ), and of course, the gender blind nature of the policies, something which we critique in depth below. Nonetheless the dominant narrative of recovery has motivated discussions of future reforms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%