2005
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_18
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Evaluating 2-DNF Formulas on Ciphertexts

Abstract: Abstract. Let ψ be a 2-DNF formula on boolean variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}. We present a homomorphic public key encryption scheme that allows the public evaluation of ψ given an encryption of the variables x1, . . . , xn. In other words, given the encryption of the bits x1, . . . , xn, anyone can create the encryption of ψ(x1, . . . , xn). More generally, we can evaluate quadratic multi-variate polynomials on ciphertexts provided the resulting value falls within a small set. We present a number of applica… Show more

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Cited by 1,233 publications
(949 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…The second assumption we need is the subgroup decision assumption, introduced in [BGN05]; it is based on the hardness of factoring, and is recalled next.…”
Section: Bilinear Groups Of Composite Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…The second assumption we need is the subgroup decision assumption, introduced in [BGN05]; it is based on the hardness of factoring, and is recalled next.…”
Section: Bilinear Groups Of Composite Ordermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Clearly, the signature σ on "ID.M " from the Waters signature scheme will give away the identity of the signer. To protect his anonymity, a signer, in our scheme, will encrypt the signature components of σ using the Boneh-Goh-Nissim [BGN05] encryption system. Additionally, the signer will attach a NIZK proof that the encrypted signature is a signature on "X.M " for 1 ≤ X ≤ 2 k , where 2 k is the number of signers in the system.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We review some general notions about bilinear groups of composite order, first used in cryptographic applications by [9]. In contrast to all prior work using composite-order bilinear groups, however, we use groups whose order N is a product of three (distinct) primes.…”
Section: Background On Pairings and Complexity Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To do this, we will make use of a bilinear group G whose order N is the product of three primes p, q, and r. Let G p , G q , and G r denote the subgroups of G having order p, q, and r, respectively. We will (informally) assume, as in [9], that a random element in any of these subgroups is indistinguishable from a random element of G. 2 Thus, we can use random elements from one subgroup to "mask" elements from another subgroup.…”
Section: Our Main Constructionmentioning
confidence: 99%