Evaluating Small UAS Operations and National Airspace System Interference Using AeroScope

Abstract

A recent rash of near mid-air collisions coupled with the widespread proliferation of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) raise concerns that integration is posing additional risk to the National Airspace System. In 2016, sUAS sighting reports by manned aircraft pilots averaged 147 per month. In the first three quarters of 2017, sUAS sightings jumped to 188 per month. The purpose of this study was to evaluate sUAS operator behavior to determine potential interference with aviation operations. While previous research has indeed yielded findings about operator behavior, such studies were generally based on data derived from Aviation Safety Reporting System filings or the UAS sighting report database maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration. In this study, the authors partnered with a UAS technology company to deploy an AeroScope, a passive radiofrequency detection device, to detect UAS flight activity in an urban area. While the device was limited to collecting flight information from only DJImanufactured platforms, it is estimated that the company holds a market share in excess of 70% providing a reasonable barometer for sUAS activity in the sample area. Over the 19-day sample period, the AeroScope device recorded 258 detections of 77 unique sUAS platforms. The authors assessed sUAS operator behavioral characteristics, including: UAS models, operating altitudes, preferred flying days and times, flight durations, and operating locations. The authors assessed 93 potential violations of 14 CFR 107 regulations, including controlled airspace breaches, exceeding maximum flight altitudes, and flight outside of daylight or civil twilight hours. The authors concluded that UAS activity in the sample area posed potential conflicts with a runway visual approach, created a collision hazard with three heliports, and heightened risk for visual flight rules operations underneath a controlled airspace shelf. The authors determined existing sUAS geofencing systems were ineffective at deterring sUAS activity unless they imposed flight restrictions in addition to hazard notification.

Detection of Conflicts Between ADS-B-Equipped Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Systems

“…It must be noted that the AeroScope equipment is limited to locating UAS platforms manufactured by DJI. While DJI has an estimated share of the sUAS market exceeding 70%, there were likely some incursions that occurred during the data collection period that were missed because the respective sUAS were not manufactured by DJI ( 15 ).…”

“…A more recent study by Wallace et al examined UAS operator behavior using an AeroScope device to determine the potential for interference with aviation operations ( 15 ). The study, while limited to only DJI sUAS platforms, recorded 258 detections of 77 unique platforms over a 19-day period in airspace around Tampa, Florida, and concluded that the detected activity posed considerable potential for conflicts with manned aircraft.…”

Local Government Policy and Planning for Unmanned Aerial Systems

“…5 However, the nationwide growth of UAS operations from hobbyists and commercial industry sectors has sparked fear among aviation safety experts that unregulated growth could diminish that safety record by increasing the number of unmarked and unidentifiable objects in the vicinity of manned aircraft operations. 6 These fears have led to concerns that mass use of these UASs, particularly small ones by recreational users and other operators unfamiliar with the National Airspace System (NAS), could lead to disasters that would impact unsuspecting passengers in commercial airlines and reduce the status of the FAA as a global leader in aviation safety and efficiency. 7 There have already been instances of UAS being sighted in airport vicinities, and several have been suspected of hitting passenger aircraft.…”