Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators

Atoyan, Ruben; Conway, Patrick

doi:10.1007/s11558-006-6612-2

Cited by 84 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…The effect is substantial, accounting for a reduction of 13 See, for example, Dreher (2006), Barro and Lee (2005), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000). See Atoyan and Conway (2006) for a more nuanced view.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?

2010

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?

2010

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“…41 See Goldstein and Montiel (1986) for an extensive treatment. 42 Atoian and Conway (2006) provide a recent application of the method of matching to evaluating the impact of IMF programs.…”

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confidence: 99%

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

2009

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This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.

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“…"Recidivism," as they label this phenomenon, is associated with extreme poverty, weak external accounts and high levels of foreign debt. A number of studies have found that countries that have used IMF programs in the past are more likely to use them again, suggesting that recidivism is a real phenomenon (Atoian and Conway, 2006;Jensen, 2004;Pop-Eleches, 2009;Sturm, Berger and de Haan, 2005). 3 This paper proposes an alternative to the prevailing view.…”

Section: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs

Bas

Stone

2013

Rev Int Organ

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The dominant approach to studying the effects of IMF programs has emphasized moral hazard, but we find that adverse selection has more impressive effects. We propose a novel strategic selection model to study the growth effects of IMF programs, which allows for the possibility of adverse selection. We find that adverse selection occurs: the countries that are most interested in participating in IMF programs are the least likely to have favorable growth outcomes. Controlling for this selection effect, we find that countries benefit from IMF programs on average in terms of higher growth rates, but that some countries benefit from participation, while others are harmed. Moral hazard predicts that long-term users of Fund resources benefit least from participating in programs, while adverse selection predicts the opposite. Contrary to previous findings, we find that IMF programs have more successful growth performance among long-term users than among short-term users.

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Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators

Abstract: IMF programs, program evaluation, sample selection bias,

Cited by 84 publications

References 22 publications

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Conditionality?

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs

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