2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.015
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

Abstract: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

1
16
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
5
3

Relationship

4
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 26 publications
(17 citation statements)
references
References 6 publications
1
16
0
Order By: Relevance
“…(), Stadelmann et al. (, ), and Carey and Hix (); for the United States Brunner et al. () provide an application.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…(), Stadelmann et al. (, ), and Carey and Hix (); for the United States Brunner et al. () provide an application.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Delegates in parliament are expected to represent voters' opinions. But the literature documents large deviations of parliamentary decisions from overall voters' preferences (Gerber and Lewis, ; Stadelmann et al., , ). Economists and political scientists have studied the effects of diverse political institutions on representation of voters' preferences, such as media and campaigning regulations, lobbying, majoritarian vs. plurality party systems, term restrictions, and many more (see Persson and Tabellini, ; Mueller, for overviews).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For the Council of States, we do not find any significant difference in the quality of voter representation by individual politicians between districts with one representative and districts with two representatives (see Stadelmann et al 2012a). Carey and Hix (2011) suggest that the "electoral sweet spot" of low-magnitude is likely to be about four to eight seats per district and not two, as in the Council of States.…”
mentioning
confidence: 86%
“…This 1 The Lower House (National Council) is the proportional representation of the population whereas the Council of States (Upper House) represents the Swiss cantons. 2 Another stream of literature making use of these video records analyzes how well constituencies are represented by their respective councilors Stadelmann et al, 2012Stadelmann et al, , 2014. Bütikofer (2014) describes party line deviation and its determinants.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%