Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current

Hayashi, Yu-ichi; Homma, Naofumi; Mizuki, Takaaki; Sugawara, Takeshi; Kayano, Yoshiki; Aoki, Takafumi; Minegishi, Shigeki; Satoh, Akashi; Sone, Hideaki; Inoue, Hiroshi

doi:10.1587/transele.e95.c.1089

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…It was found that, the radiative interference patterns of TV power supplies yielded discernable information about the media being played. The work of Hayashi [68][69][70] has demonstrated the viability of obtaining secret keys from the radiation patterns of power and communication cables attached to FPGA (field programmable gate array) boards. His work has shown that, cryptographic key information may leak from near field [68] and far field [69] radiation patterns.…”

Section: Many Proofs Of the Concept Have Been Demonstratedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

López¹,

Sargolzaei²,

Santana³

et al. 2015

JEPE

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Abstract:The smart grid is the next generation of power and distribution systems. The integration of advanced network, communications, and computing techniques allows for the enhancement of efficiency and reliability. The smart grid interconnects the flow of information via the power line, intelligent metering, renewable and distributed energy systems, and a monitoring and controlling infrastructure. For all the advantages that these components come with, they remain at risk to a spectrum of physical and digital attacks. This paper will focus on digital vulnerabilities within the smart grid and how they may be exploited to form full fledged attacks on the system. A number of countermeasures and solutions from the literature will also be reported, to give an overview of the options for dealing with such problems. This paper serves as a triggering point for future research into smart grid cyber security.

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Section: Many Proofs Of the Concept Have Been Demonstratedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

López¹,

Sargolzaei²,

Santana³

et al. 2015

JEPE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, different types of risks have been reported that could bypass such protection by utilizing radiated emission, which is a physical phenomenon prevalent in the hardware of electronic devices [2]. The technique based on this physical phenomenon is called a side-channel attack, and its purpose is to classify unspecified information such as cryptographic keys [3], display information [4], and other types of eavesdropping. This study intends to focus on the possibility of the information reconstruction from the electromagnetic leakage (EM leakage) from the standardized display interface (SDI) cables, and the related historical background is briefly described.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Quantitative Analysis of Compromising Emanation from HDMI and Possibility of Information Reconstruction

Lee

Choi

Nam

et al. 2022

Preprint

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This paper presents the electromagnetic interference characteristics of the high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI), a well-known display interface, and quantitatively offers the possibility of information from the leakage in the perspective of radio communication. After analyzing the leakage characteristics, a pseudo-signal model is generated based on the characteristics and behavioral features of the software-defined radio. Subsequently, the model is utilized to investigate the performance of frame-averaging to improve the low signal-to-noise ratio of sensitive information contained in the leakage. In addition, the frame-averaging scheme is quantitatively analyzed under various environmental assumptions. Based on these contributions, the paper offers several indexes that quantitatively present meaningful information in EM leakage. Finally, the actual measurement results are compared with those of the pseudo-model to verify our work.

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“…However, different types of risks also have been reported that could bypass such protection by utilizing radiated emission, which is a physical phenomenon inherent in the hardware of electronic devices [2]. The technique based on this physical phenomenon is called a side-channel attack, and its purpose is to recover specific information such as cryptographic keys [3], display information [4], or other types of sensitive information. This study intends to focus on the recent technological progress on the possibility of the information re-construction from the electromagnetic leakage (EM leakage) from the standardized display interface (SDI) cables, and the related historical background is briefly described.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Quantitative Analysis of Compromising Emanation From TMDS Interface and Possibility of Sensitive Information Leakage

et al. 2022

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This paper investigates the electromagnetic interference characteristics of the transitionminimized differential signaling (TMDS) scheme, a well-known technology for rapid serial data transmission, from a radio communication perspective. Such scrutiny regarding the leaking phenomenon inspires a pseudo model of the compromising signal model, which can simultaneously consider behavioral features of the software-defined radio with a simple RF front-end measuring the leakage. In this work, a conceptual explanation with mathematical formulations in implementing the pseudo model has been presented. Subsequently, by merging the model with various extra noises being in nature, the model can be utilized to facilitate and quantify the possibility of information extraction from the defected electromagnetic signatures. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there are asynchronous problems due to inevitable timing errors in video display devices, even with a sophisticated acquisition system, turning out to be fatal for the frame-averaging scheme conducted before the signal demodulation. In view of these challenges, we have formulated a synchronizing scheme and verified validity by utilizing the pseudo model with the extra noise to take into account the asynchronous problem. Moreover, the structural similarity (SSIM), a function of the signal-to-noise ratio, can provide the number of frames for the frame-averaging process and eventually give the minimum acquisition time to earn meaningful information from the compromising emanation. Finally, after the appropriate post-processing, the extracted information from the actual measurements is compared with the reconstruction from the pseudo-model results revealing excellent agreements.

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Evaluation of Information Leakage from Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current

Cited by 14 publications

References 18 publications

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

Smart Grid Cyber Security: An Overview of Threats and Countermeasures

A Quantitative Analysis of Compromising Emanation from HDMI and Possibility of Information Reconstruction

A Quantitative Analysis of Compromising Emanation From TMDS Interface and Possibility of Sensitive Information Leakage

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