Background: The evaluation of evidence, which frequently takes the form of scientific evidence, necessitates the input of experts in relevant fields. The results are presented as expert opinions or expert evaluations, which are generally accepted as a reliable representation of the facts. A further issue that remains unresolved though is the process of evaluating the expertise and knowledge of an expert in the first instance. In general, earned certificates, grades and other objective criteria are typically regarded as representative documentation to substantiate an expert status. However, there is a possibility that these may not always be sufficiently representative. Objectives: The goal of the present study was to provide evidence that the neural processing of law-relevant and law-irrelevant terms varies significantly between participants who have received training in the field of law (experts) and those who have not (novices). Methods: To this end, changes in brain activity were recorded via electroencephalography (EEG) during visual presentations of terms belonging to five different categories (fake right, democracy, filler word, basic right and rule of law). Event-related potentials (ERPs) were subsequently averaged for each category and subjected to statistical analysis. Results: The results clearly demonstrate that participants trained in law processed fake rights and filler words in a similar manner. Furthermore, both of these conditions elicited different levels of brain activity compared to all law-relevant terms. This was not the case in participants who had not received legal training. The brains of untrained participants processed all five term categories in a strikingly similar manner. In light of prior knowledge regarding language processing, the primary focus was on two distinct electrode locations: one in the left posterior region, and the other in the left frontal region. In both locations, the most prominent differences in brain activity elicited by the aforementioned term categories in law-trained participants occurred approximately 450 milliseconds after stimulus onset. The results were further corroborated by a repeated-measures ANOVA and subsequent t-tests, which also demonstrated the absence of this effect in law-untrained participants. Conclusions: The findings of this study provide empirical evidence that brain activity measurements, in particular ERPs, can be used to distinguish between experts trained in a specific field of expertise and novices in that field. Such findings have the potential to facilitate objective assessments of expertise, enabling comparisons between experts and novices that extend beyond traditional criteria such as qualifications and experience. Instead, individuals can be evaluated based on their cognitive processes, as observed through brain activity.