Event‐triggered detection of cyberattacks on load frequency control

Abstract

Modern power systems are extensively interlaced with data communication at various levels leading to increased vulnerability to cyberattacks at individual components as well as integrated controls. An effective cyber protection is, therefore, fast becoming an indispensable requirement for the smart grids. A false data injection (FDI) attack on load frequency control (LFC) is a stealth process, which has devastating consequences while at times may also lead to catastrophic system blackouts. This work comprises detailed analyses of the LFC system vulnerability to FDI attacks. It further develops an efficient eventtriggered detection scheme to leverage the LFC protection against FDI attacks. This developed event-triggered generalised extended state observer (ET-GESO) uses Lyapunov stability analysis to derive the event-triggering condition and thereby reduce the communication burden significantly. The feasibility of the proposed ET-GESO is further studied by demonstrating its Zeno behaviour exclusion. Extensive simulation studies are performed on a peer-reported two-area power transacting system and IEEE 39-bus New England system. A comparison study between the proposed technique and reported Kalman filter-based detection scheme is also performed. Different FDI attack formulations and their detection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed detection method.

Online Recursive Detection and Adaptive Fuzzy Mitigation of Cyber-Physical Attacks Targeting Topology of IMG: An LFC Case Study

“…Other well-established model-based approaches in the literature include the parametric feedback linearization using a static estimation process [13], graphicalbased methods [14], chi-square detector [15], matrix separation approach [16], nonlinear observer-based methods [17], and non-stationary signal processing approach of Hilbert-Huang transform [18]. Despite the advantages of mentioned approaches for CPAs detection, e.g., real-time detection and low computational burden, they are often designed for a single time slot, i.e., operation point, not a wide range of system operation [19], [20]. Moreover, the mentioned approaches neglect the uncertainties in the operation of IMG, e.g., varying parameters, topology change owing to load disturbances, intermittent nature of RESs, and operation in islanded and grid-connected modes [21].…”

“…COMPARISON WITH THE LITERATURE [6], [27] [29], [30] [8], [12], [19], [20] [31], [32] Our Proposed Method measurement channels of LFC systems. In [24], a new virtual inertia control strategy in IMGs is introduced to alleviate the impact of the attack.…”