Everyday Consequences of Analytic Thinking

Pennycook, Gordon; Fugelsang, Jonathan A.; Koehler, Derek J.

doi:10.1177/0963721415604610

Cited by 266 publications

(252 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Stanovich (e.g., 2004;2009b) has argued that thinking disposition is an underappreciated determinant of psychological outcomes. Recent research has supported the idea that cognitive style plays a consequential role in psychological domains that are of some general import (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b): e.g., creativity (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014), moral judgments and values (Paxton, Unger, & Greene, 2012;Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014b;Rozyman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014), religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;Pennycook et al, 2014a;Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013;Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016;Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), and even Smartphone technology use (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015 …”

Section: Individual Differences In Analytic Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

Pennycook¹,

Fugelsang²,

Koehler³

2015

Cognitive Psychology

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380

505

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The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes ('Type 1' processes are fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and 'Type 2' processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition.

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Section: Individual Differences In Analytic Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

Pennycook¹,

Fugelsang²,

Koehler³

2015

Cognitive Psychology

Self Cite

380

505

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“…That is, those who do well on the CRT are also less prone to rely on heuristics and biases even after measures of cognitive ability have been taken into account (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014. Moreover, the CRT predicts a wide range of variables after controlling for numeracy (Pennycook et al, 2015a;.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures

2017

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The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or intuitions. CRT problems are unique because they reliably cue intuitive but incorrect responses and, therefore, appear simple among those who do poorly. By virtue of being composed of so-called Btrick problems^that, in theory, could be discovered as such, it is commonly held that the predictive validity of the CRT is undermined by prior experience with the task. Indeed, recent studies have shown that people who have had previous experience with the CRT score higher on the test. Naturally, however, it is not obvious that this actually undermines the predictive validity of the test. Across six studies with~2,500 participants and 17 variables of interest (e.g., religious belief, bullshit receptivity, smartphone usage, susceptibility to heuristics and biases, and numeracy), we did not find a single case in which the predictive power of the CRT was significantly undermined by repeated exposure. This occurred despite the fact that we replicated the previously reported increase in accuracy among individuals who reported previous experience with the CRT. We speculate that the CRT remains robust after multiple exposures because less reflective (more intuitive) individuals fail to realize that being presented with apparently easy problems more than once confers information about the task's actual difficulty.

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“…Furthermore, these people are less likely to believe in evolution (Gervais, 2015). These findings indicate that people's propensity to use intuition versus reflection may have important implications for their real-world beliefs (Pennycook et al, 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 73%

“…Better performance on the CRT has also been related to preferring larger rewards later than smaller immediately available rewards (Frederick, 2005), choosing gambles with better expected values (Frederick, 2005), preferring more explanatory detail (Fernbach, Sloman, Louis, & Shube, 2013), and performing better on heuristics and biases tasks (Toplak et al, 2011). Furthermore, many of these associations remain when statistically controlling for cognitive ability (Pennycook et al, 2015;Toplak et al, 2011).…”

Section: The Crt and Real-world Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Cognitive Reflection Test: A Measure of Intuition/Reflection, Numeracy, and Insight Problem Solving, and the Implications for Understanding Real-World Judgments and Beliefs

Patel¹,

Baker²,

Scherer³

2018

Preprint

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The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has increasingly dominated theorizing about individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities, and it is associated with many real-world beliefs and judgments, such as religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and moral judgments. The CRT triggers common incorrect responses that come to mind easily, and it is assumed that recognizing this error is tantamount to solving the problems. As a result, incorrect answers on the CRT purportedly indicate an intuitive thought process, whereas correct answers purportedly indicate a reflective thought process. It has also been argued that the CRT problems are fundamentally different from insight problems because insight problems often cause people to sit lost in thought, unable to solve the problem until they correctly reframe it. The present research tested these assumptions and found that a substantial proportion of people have difficulty solving the problems even when the “intuitive” response is unavailable to them, the correct answer is among four multiple-choice options, and they take time to reflect. Associations between the CRT and beliefs (religiosity, paranormal beliefs, moral judgments, etc.) remained even under conditions in which CRT errors appeared to result from more reflective thought than correct responses. Furthermore, multi-dimensional item response theory models indicated that the CRT loaded onto numeracy and insight problem solving ability factors rather than its own unique factor. Additionally, regression analyses indicated that numeracy and insight may account for many associations between the CRT and real-world beliefs. Broader implications for dual-process theories of reasoning and judgment are discussed.

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Everyday Consequences of Analytic Thinking

Cited by 266 publications

References 45 publications

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures

The Cognitive Reflection Test: A Measure of Intuition/Reflection, Numeracy, and Insight Problem Solving, and the Implications for Understanding Real-World Judgments and Beliefs

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