“Everything was fine”*: An analysis of the drill crew's situation awareness on Deepwater Horizon

Roberts, Ruby; Flin, Rhona; Cleland, Jennifer

doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2015.08.008

Cited by 27 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…The findings extend existing knowledge on the SA components required for kick detection outlined by Roberts et al (2015b) which can be used to form the basis of interventions such as effective training and work design recommendations that support the operator and consequently improve safety.…”

Section: Recommendationssupporting

confidence: 58%

“…missing indicators) can through poor decision making and unnecessary risk taking have been recognised in process safety (Kaber & Endsley, 1998;Taylor, Wijk, May & Carhart, 2015) (e.g. Deepwater Horizon; Roberts et al, 2015b;Texas City;Khan & Amyotte, 2007; explosion at the chemical production facility West Virginia Institute, Naderpour, Nazir & Lou, 2015). A range of SA theories has been proposed (e.g., Smith and Hancock, 1995;Stanton, Salmon, Walker & Jenkins, 2009;Wickens, 2002).…”

Section: Situation Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The self-report Work Situation Awareness rating tool was employed to examine the impact on stress, sleep disruption and fatigue on SA, as well as the relationship between SA and unsafe behaviour and incident involvement in drilling (Sneddon, Mearns & Flin, 2013). Interviews with drill crew members and observations of well control scenarios in a high-fidelity simulator were conducted and utilized to develop the Drillers' SA model (Roberts et al, 2015b) (see Figure 1), as based upon Endsley's (1995) More recently, the Drillers' SA model has also been used to examine process safety in the drilling industry as an accident analysis framework to examine the drill crew's SA on Deepwater Horizon (Roberts et al, 2015b). It provided insight into the crew's likely cognitive processes in the lead up to the blowout and why the crew erroneously believed that the well was stable despite indicators to the contrary.…”

Section: Situation Awareness Research For Kick Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

How to recognise a kick: A cognitive task analysis of drillers’ situation awareness during well operations

Roberts

Flin

Cleland

2016

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

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Section: Recommendationssupporting

confidence: 58%

Section: Situation Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Situation Awareness Research For Kick Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

How to recognise a kick: A cognitive task analysis of drillers’ situation awareness during well operations

Roberts

Flin

Cleland

2016

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

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“…Following the blowout on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig (2010) in the Gulf of Mexico that killed 11 workers and injured a further 50, as well as creating an enormous marine pollution event (Report to the President 2011), the offshore oil and gas industry became interested in applying CRM to enhance safety (Flin et al 2014). Social scientists' analyses of the accident show clearly how failures in non-technical skills could have contributed to the trajectory of this event (Hopkins 2012;Reader and O'Connor 2014;Roberts et al 2015b). In order to design customised training for drillers and other well control specialists, detailed task analyses are required to pinpoint the most important non-technical skills that can help to protect the safety of the well (Roberts et al 2015a).…”

Section: Crm Beyond the Flightdeckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Safety Training

2018

SpringerBriefs in Applied Sciences and Technology

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use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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“…Social scientists' analyses of the accident show clearly how failures in non-technical skills could have contributed to the trajectory of this event (Hopkins 2012;Reader and O'Connor 2014;Roberts et al 2015b). In order to design customised training for drillers and other well control specialists, detailed task analyses are required to pinpoint the most important non-technical skills that can help to protect the safety of the well (Roberts et al 2015a).…”

Section: Crm Beyond the Flightdeckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing Safety Performance: Non-technical Skills and a Modicum of Chronic Unease

Flin

2017

Beyond Safety Training

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Current debates on professionalism and safety cover a range of interpretative challenges and theoretical perspectives, as the workshop organized by FonCSI in 2015 revealed. One avenue for consideration was to address the question of the role of professionalism in the job with regard to safety. For example, should safety training just be part of normal job training or should it have a separate and distinctive position in the training curriculum? In this paper, I consider two ways in which safety training and safety thinking are being integrated into routine managerial and technical work. The first of these is behavioural, namely to focus on the non-technical skills (NTS) for a given job, as evidenced by the airlines' Crew Resource Management training and assessment programmes. This approach is now being adopted in other safety-critical sectors, such as acute medicine and offshore oil and gas operations. The second direction is more attitudinal in nature: it examines the relatively novel concept of chronic unease, derived from the High Reliability Organisation literature. These two approaches show that addressing both workplace behaviours (non-technical skills) and underlying attitudes to operational risks (chronic unease), can help to build protective skills for safety into the professional job repertoire.

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“Everything was fine”*: An analysis of the drill crew's situation awareness on Deepwater Horizon

Cited by 27 publications

References 44 publications

How to recognise a kick: A cognitive task analysis of drillers’ situation awareness during well operations

How to recognise a kick: A cognitive task analysis of drillers’ situation awareness during well operations

Beyond Safety Training

Enhancing Safety Performance: Non-technical Skills and a Modicum of Chronic Unease

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