Evidence-Based Biosafety: a Review of the Principles and Effectiveness of Microbiological Containment Measures

Abstract

SUMMARY We examined the available evidence on the effectiveness of measures aimed at protecting humans and the environment against the risks of working with genetically modified microorganisms (GMOs) and with non-GMO pathogenic microorganisms. A few principles and methods underlie the current biosafety practice: risk assessment, biological containment, concentration and enclosure, exposure minimization, physical containment, and hazard minimization. Many of the current practices are based on experience and expert judgment. The effectiveness of biosafety measures may be evaluated at the level of single containment equipment items and procedures, at the level of the laboratory as a whole, or at the clinical-epidemiological level. Data on the containment effectiveness of equipment and laboratories are scarce and fragmented. Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are therefore important for evaluating the effectiveness of biosafety. For the majority of LAIs there appears to be no direct cause, suggesting that failures of biosafety were not noticed or that containment may have been insufficient. The number of reported laboratory accidents associated with GMOs is substantially lower than that of those associated with non-GMOs. It is unknown to what extent specific measures contribute to the overall level of biosafety. We therefore recommend that the evidence base of biosafety practice be strengthened.

O risco na pesquisa de campo em saúde na Amazônia brasileira: mais de um século de desafios (1901-2015)

“…Outro ponto a ser considerado é que os laboratórios de campo comumente apresentam características improvisadas, proporcionando menor condição de controle de riscos 52,77 . Assim, observa-se que existem diversos fatores, próprios da estrutura de trabalho nas pesquisas de campo, que determinam riscos de diversas naturezas, os quais podem afetar o indivíduo e representar, isoladamente ou em conjunto com outros riscos, uma condição para o adoecimento.…”

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“…Risk groups are a way of categorizing the level of risk associated with a particular biological agent 39 . Risk groups range from lower • An individual human to another human or to an animal; or • An individual animal to another animal or to a human; and  In respect of which effective treatment and preventive measures are not usually available.…”

Networking for BSL-3/4 laboratory scientist training

“…However, these regulations cannot cover all aspects of working with new organisms. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus outbreak in 2003 can be seen as a showcase for this dilemma 4 . The notion that scientists who work in BSL-3/4 laboratories cannot be trusted seems contradictory to the fact that these scientists, working with highly contagious and pathogenic agents, have an eminent interest in their own health and safety.…”

“…A recent literature review concluded that deviation from general 'good microbiological practice' is the most frequent cause of laboratory-acquired infections and that training for compliance with procedures and regulations seems to be the best method to avoid such infections 4 . In this light, our course offers the opportunity to improve the basic training that is available for BSL-3/4 scientists and the prerequisite initial training for beginners.…”